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A REJECTION OF ABSOLUTIST DUTIES AS A
BARRIER TO CREDITOR PROTECTION:
FACILITATING DIRECTORIAL
DECISIVENESS SURROUNDING INSOLVENCY
THROUGH THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE.
Philip Gavin*
INTRODUCTION
Fiduciary duties restrain the otherwise largely unfettered control of
directors in directing corporate activity. These duties are generally
conceptualized as being owed to the corporation for the ultimate benefit of
its shareholders.1 As the scope of corporate legal reasoning expands, so too
have attempts to recognize the entitlement of interested parties other than
shareholders to invoke fiduciary protections.2 A significant hindrance to the
discharge of these potentially expansive duties within shareholder primacy is
judicial and regulatory emphasis on bright-line constructions of insolvency
whereby duties change only once the corporation has become insolvent.
This Article draws attention to the difficulties that directors may face
when seeking to discharge their duties as a corporation approaches
insolvency, in particular when directors must discern the point at which a
corporation has become insolvent. It argues that discretion allowed to
directors by the business judgment rule will be crucial to overcoming these
difficulties. To do this, this article examines the nature of duties owed by
directors both before and after insolvency, and accepts the stance taken by
Delaware courts in recent years towards an expansive understanding of a
corporation’s interests upon insolvency.3 It then considers unresolved issues
arising from how insolvency is defined and argues that the current view of
insolvency as a bright-line threshold is overly simplistic and overlooks the
multitude of metrics used to measure a corporation’s financial condition. In
its stead, this Article posits that the business judgment rule provides sufficient
latitude for directors to navigate commercial activity nearing insolvency.
* Adjunct Assistant Professor, School of Law, Trinity College Dublin. The author would like
to thank Professor Deirdre Ahern for her feedback on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. “[T]he interests of the company as an artificial person cannot be distinguished from the
interests of the persons who are interested in it.” Brady v. Brady (1987) 3 BCC 535, 547 (appeal
taken from Eng.).
2. Stakeholder theory is nothing new in corporate jurisprudence. See generally E. Merrick
Dodd Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); A.A Berle
Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932).
However, there is a resurgence on the topic, some of which has occurred via statutory reform outside
the United States. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 172 (UK); see also Christopher Brunner, The
Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385 (2008).
3. See Quadrant Structured Prod. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 174 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2014); N. Am.
Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007).
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Part I will provide an overview of duties owed by directors to the
corporation and how the interests of corporations are understood by reference
to the interests of shareholders. It examines whether the law prefers directors
to unreservedly pursue shareholder wealth without regard for the interests of
other stakeholders—termed absolute shareholder primacy—or whether
directors can legitimately consider non-shareholder interests when engaging
in commercial activity—termed non-absolute shareholder primacy. Part II
examines the role of the business judgment rule in shielding directors from
liability when they exercise discretion to balance the interests of stakeholders
upon insolvency. Part III outlines changes to the duties of directors upon
insolvency. It provides an overview of the requirement for directors to
consider the interests of creditors along with the interests of shareholders and
other stakeholders within a widened pool of relevant interests. It argues that
conceiving insolvency as a bright-line threshold creates difficulties for
directors who must navigate their corporations through the uncertainties of
financial distress. Furthermore, this part explores the reality of solvency not
as an absolute state, but rather as a spectrum wherein insolvency can continue
to worsen. Part IV argues that the business judgment rule may provide a
solution to these difficulties by giving deference to the directors’ good faith
assessments of the corporation’s financial condition. This would mitigate the
harshness of the bright-line insolvency threshold and provide flexibility to
directors when navigating financial distress. Finally, Part V provides
guidance to directors when acting under the auspices of the business
judgment rule. This can be achieved by exploring how the interests of
stakeholders, namely shareholders and creditors, should be reconciled when
the corporation is both solvent and insolvent. It argues that directors are more
than capable of balancing the interests of parties involved in the corporation,
provided that their discretion remains shielded by the business judgment rule.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE BOARDS
A. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY

As Keay opines, “[w]hile shareholder primacy acknowledges the fact
that constituencies other than the shareholders play an important role in the
life of a corporation, its aim is to ensure maximization of shareholder
wealth.” 4 A director’s duties are perceived through this objective. While
directors do not owe duties to shareholders, they do owe duties to the
corporation and therefore owe loyalty to the corporation’s objective.
Deviating from this objective is occasionally supported academically but is
4. ANDREW KEAY, THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE 280 (1st ed. 2011); see also Adams, Hermalin
& Weisbach, The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework
and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 58 (2010).
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seldom applied by courts. This judicial reluctance is especially evident in
American jurisprudence:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit
of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of the means
to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the
reduction of profits, or to the non-distribution of profits among stockholders
in order to devote themselves to other purposes.5

This exercise of discretion is generally referred to as the shareholder
primacy model. It first arose in response to the power of corporate entities
and their directorships, and has “grown rapidly, so much so that the
‘administration of corporations’, [has] become ‘the crux of ... industrial
life.’” 6 In seeking to place legal restraints on the economic power of
corporate boards, Berle asserted that “managerial powers were held in trust
for stockholders as the sole beneficiaries of the corporate enterprise.” 7
Equating shareholders to equitable beneficiaries overcomes the difficulty at
law, whereby shareholders are not legally the owners of a corporation and
therefore cannot be the direct legal recipient of directorial concern.
Accordingly, the restraints placed on directors under this model are
“outgrowths of ‘equitable rules somewhat analogous to those which apply in
favour of a cestui que trust to the trustee’s exercise of wide powers granted
to him in the instrument making him a fiduciary.’” 8 Shareholder primacy
therefore expands the obligations and duties of directors so that they are not
merely acting as a constituent body or as an employee of the corporate entity,
but rather as an agent of the corporation. These legal obligations are informed
by the ultimate underlying objective of directorial operation: maximizing
shareholder wealth.
B. ABSOLUTIST AND NON-ABSOLUTIST SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
Shareholder primacy arguably means that “maximizing shareholder
wealth is the corporation’s only true concern, its raison d’être.”9 However,
seminal case law allows for a less absolutist view, meaning that while
shareholders are the dominant concern, the interests of other parties cannot
be completely disregarded. Indeed, Dodge referenced the primary purpose of
corporations and found that alternative interests cannot attain primacy over

5. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
6. Paddy Ireland, Back to the Future? Adolf Berle, the Law Commission and Directors’ Duties,
20 CO. LAW. 203, 205 (1999).
7. Id.
8. Id. (quoting A.A Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049
(1931)).
9. Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163,
164 (2008) (emphasis added).
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shareholder wealth maximization.10 However, even where one accepts that
shareholder wealth maximization is the primary consideration of corporate
boards, it is not necessary for boards to discount the interests of other
stakeholders entirely. Instead, boards are fully capable of considering the
consequences their decisions will have on other stakeholders and whether
these consequences will ultimately impact the corporation or the
shareholders. 11 Thus, directors should be able to consider the wider
implications of their decisions without abandoning shareholder primacy as
their dominant concern.
Though shareholder primacy remains the key rationale, the question of
how alternative constituencies may inform business strategy has triggered
significant academic and judicial debate. Mirroring the aforementioned
dichotomy of absolute and non-absolute shareholder primacy deriving from
Dodge, academics have disagreed on the appropriate tact to be taken. Indeed,
this question played a central role in the seminal Berle 12 and Dodd 13
discourse. Dodge itself has fallen under increased scrutiny as a “charming
and easily understood fable of shareholder wealth maximization.”14
Shlensky offers an alternative stance that remains rooted in shareholder
primacy by considering the view that decline in the surrounding
neighborhood is ultimately harmful to the shareholders’ interests15 because
the “short-term profits. . .made might be off-set by a diminution of . . .
reputation.” 16 This stance retains shareholders principally as the sole
recipient of directorial focus, but conceptualizes the “ratable benefit” to
shareholders as being legitimately informed by alternative constituency
interests.17 These ratable benefits may include sustaining long-term returns
through improved employee or supplier relations or engendering goodwill
through community engagement.
Stout argues that these cases are merely outdated dicta from states that
are hardly known as bastions of corporate jurisprudence, especially in
contrast to Delaware. 18 However, older Delaware caselaw presents
contradictory views on this issue. The rule in Katz v. Oak Industries provides
insight into the views adopted by Delaware courts on the conflict illustrated
10. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
11. David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 1013, 1016 (2013).
12. “[A]ll powers granted to a corporation or the management of a corporation . . . are
necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their
interest appears.” A.A Berle, supra note 8, at 1049 (emphasis added).
13. “[T]here is in fact a growing feeling not only that business has responsibilities to the
community but that our corporate managers who control business should voluntarily and without
waiting for legal compulsion manage it in such a way as to fulfill those responsibilities.” Dodd,
supra note 2, at 1153–54.
14. Stout, supra note 9, at 175.
15. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
16. Keay, supra note 4, at 212.
17. A.A Berle, supra note 8.
18. Stout, supra note 14, at 166–67.
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in Dodge and Shlensky. Katz states that courts should give deference to
directors who “attempt” to favor “the long-run interests of the corporation’s
stockholders” at the occasional “expense of others.”19 This view preserves
shareholders’ interests as the sole concern of directors, but grants broad
deference to directors in deciding whether to pursue short-term or long-term
gain and in identifying how the interests of other stakeholders fit into the
objective they choose. Ultimately, Katz affirms that the interests of other
stakeholders are not themselves the end-goal for directors to pursue, meaning
that, much like in Dodge, shareholders remain the board’s primary
consideration.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. contains an even more expansive
implication, stating that “the board’s power to act derives from its
fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which
includes stockholders,” 20 thereby implying that shareholders are but one
constituency to be considered. However, while some of the judicial
observations in Unocal can have general application, the case itself
concerned a takeover bid—a particular circumstance in commercial life in
stark contrast to day-to-day business activity. 21 Additionally, Quadrant
Structured Product Co. v. Vertin and North American Catholic Education
Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla suggest that while shareholders
retain primacy and creditors are incapable of independently thwarting
shareholder primacy, creditors’ interests may appropriately influence the
manner in which directors perceive shareholder value maximization to best
be realized.22
II. SHAREHOLDER ABSOLUTISM AND THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE
The broad scope of discretion afforded to directorial decision-making in
Delaware should not be understated. Shielding this discretion from much
substantive judicial scrutiny is the business judgment rule.23 The business
judgment rule exemplifies the deference afforded by courts to board decisionmaking by playing a role in thwarting claims by corporate stakeholders.24
19. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A. 2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).
20. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (emphasis added).
21. For a discussion on the Unocal and Revlon standards for deciding the interests of the
company during a change of control and the implications of these standards for corporate
governance generally, see LEO E STRINE JR., RESTORATION: THE ROLE STAKEHOLDER
GOVERNANCE MUST PLAY IN RECREATING A FAIR AND SUSTAINABLE AMERICAN ECONOMY A
REPLY TO PROFESSOR ROCK 9-15 (2020).
22. See Quadrant Structured Prod. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 174 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2014); N. Am.
Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007).
23. The business judgment rule is the “presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984).
24. See generally Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A. 2d. 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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Deference to directors allows the board to unilaterally decide whether the
interests of the corporation are to be understood by sole reference to
shareholders or with a more expansive consideration of stakeholder interests
necessary to further the success of the corporation. If directors did not have
such deference, then the board may fail to consider the interests of
stakeholders in any capacity. Instead, directors would myopically pursue
shareholder primacy so as to avoid litigation brought by shareholders.
Therefore, the facilitation of wider directorial discretion by the business
judgment rule or any other means enables the consideration of wider
constituency interests, albeit in a limited capacity.
To facilitate directorial authority, the business judgment rule extends its
protection in the following manner:
[D]irectors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are
interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good
faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business
purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes
the failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.25

According to Strine, while “directors must make stockholder welfare
their sole end, . . . other interests may be taken into consideration [but] only
as a means of promoting stockholder welfare.”26 Therefore, when identifying
the rational business purpose for their decisions, directors may account for
the relevance of stakeholder interests in maximizing the value of the
corporation for its shareholders. Given that the tasks of decision-making and
identifying these rational business purposes is assigned to directors, the
capacity for shareholders to repudiate the assertions of the board are
significantly limited.27 In realizing this, “case law interpreting the business
judgment rule often explicitly authorizes directors to sacrifice shareholders’
interests to protect other constituencies.” 28 Therefore, Dodge and its ilk
would be better understood as “evidence that corporate directors ought to
maximize shareholder wealth [which is] what many believe the proper
purpose of a well-functioning corporation should be.”29
This does not preclude other interests from consideration, especially
where the corporation faces either a change of control 30 or a real risk of

25. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (emphasis added).
26. See Leo E. Strine Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of
the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 768 (2015).
27. Id.
28. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247, 303 (1999).
29. Stout, supra note 9, at 172–173.
30. See STRINE JR., supra note 21. See also, Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of
Board of Directors and Stockholders in Change of Control Transactions: Is There Any ‘There’
There?, 75 U.S.C. L. REV. 1167 (2002).
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insolvency.31 The role of the business judgment rule is therefore twofold: it
firstly preserves the discretion of directions, and in turn, allows the board to
adopt a non-absolutist shareholder primacy model. This means that while
corporations will operate for the ultimate benefit of shareholders, the interests
of other stakeholders will remain relevant in the exercise of board discretion.
There is ongoing debate over whether the business judgment rule amounts
merely to a form of judicial deference or abstention,32 or whether it amounts
to an active standard of liability.33 However, this debate is irrelevant as in
either case the business judgment rule preserves the discretion of the board,
which in turn facilitates the balancing of interests between corporate
stakeholders.
A. AN EXPANSIVE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: CONCERNS FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SELF-DEALING
Criticism of the business judgment rule often centers upon it weakening
board accountability. By limiting the potential for shareholders to sue, there
are fewer avenues for effective oversight. These concerns may be
exacerbated where directors can account for interests other than the
shareholders’. Even where shareholder welfare remains the “sole end” of
corporate purpose, 34 the more discretion afforded to directors, the more
difficult it becomes for shareholders to successfully argue that the directors’
approach towards promoting shareholder welfare was incorrect. 35 This is
coupled by the fact that the stakeholders, whose interests may be considered
by directors, are not themselves given a cause of action and the role of
oversight remains one entrusted to shareholders. One concern is that the more
protective the business judgment rule is of director discretion, the greater the
risk of self-dealing or other board-associated agency costs. 36 Reinforcing
these concerns is the limited review contemplated by the business judgment
rule. As Chancellor Allen concluded, “such limited substantive review as the
rule contemplates (i.e., is the judgment under review ‘egregious’ or

31. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 788 n. 53 (Del Ch. 2004)
(affirming that directors can account for the appropriate risks the company should undertake, and
the implications of said risks for those involved in the company, when insolvency is an issue.)
32. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 83, 95 (2004).
33. Id. at 90.
34. Strine Jr., supra note 26, at 768.
35. A clear example of this difficulty has arisen in the United Kingdom which has put this
enlightened shareholder model into legislation but has given significant discretion to directors in
deciding how stakeholder interests serve the interests of shareholders. See Daniel Attenborough,
Misreading the Directors’ Fiduciary Duty of Good Faith, 20 J. CORP. L. STUD. 73–98 (2020).
36. See e.g., Vladimir Atanasov, Bernard Black & Conrad S. Ciccotello, Law and Tunneling, 37
J. CORP. L. 1 (2011).
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‘irrational’ or ‘so beyond reason,’ etc.) really is a way of inferring bad
faith.”37
The most common function of the business judgment rule is to shield
directors from claims asserting breaches of the duty of care. 38 This may
present a difficulty for directors who seek to balance the interests of
stakeholders and any conflict that may arise between shareholders and
creditors when the corporation is at or nearing insolvency. The reason for this
difficulty is that cases concerning how directors conceive of a corporation’s
interests are typically cases concerning the directors’ duty of loyalty, not the
duty of care. Nevertheless, while caselaw concerning the duty of care appears
the most abundant in business judgment rule analyses, the rule can shield
directors for claims over breaches of other duties provided that directors act
in good faith and in a manner “attributed to a rational business purpose.”39
Accordingly, if wider constituency considerations that ultimately promote
shareholder interests were to inform a rational business purpose, then the
business judgment rule may extend to business strategies past bare
shareholder primacy.
The deference to directors is understandable because the aim of the
business judgment rule is not to restrict directors acting in good faith. Instead,
the focus is to detect bad faith decision-making, particularly in “the classic
self-dealing loyalty context [wherein] directors will shoulder the burden [of
proof]”40 without the protection of the business judgment rule. The business
judgment rule does not apply in instances of any “motives alleged . . .
[involving] fraud, illegality or conflict of interest.”41 This ameliorates a major
concern: the two-masters problem 42 —the concern that once directors are
entitled to consider the interests of competing stakeholders, it becomes
difficult to hold them accountable to the interests of any one group of
interested parties 43 making them answerable to no party. 44 This lack of
accountability allows directors to engage in self-dealing, but the business
37. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 1989 WL 7036, at *13 n.13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31,
1989).
38. “[T]he one thing about the business judgment rule on which everyone agrees is that it
insulates directors from liability for negligence.” STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW (4th ed.
2020) §6.1.
39. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000).
40. Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule,
Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 427 (2013).
41. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
42. “A manager who is told to serve two masters (a little for the equity holders, a little for the
community) has been freed of both and is answerable to neither.” FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991). See also, Elaine
Sternberg, The Defects of Stakeholder Theory, 5 CORP. GOVERNANCE INT’L R. 3 (1997).
43. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42.
44. For an analysis of the interrelationship between shareholder disempowerment and board
accountability, contrast Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) with Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves
Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (2013).
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judgment rule will not shield self-dealing directors. These directors will face
heightened scrutiny for breaches of their duty of loyalty. Directors who
engage in good faith balancing of stakeholder interests with an eye toward
shareholder wealth maximization, provided they are not self-dealing, enjoy
wide deference through the business judgment rule.
B. BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF CONSTITUENCIES AND THE
AUTHORITY OF DIRECTORS
One concern may be that expansive recognition of constituency interests
may itself be unduly restrictive of directorial decision-making. Jensen raised
the concern that “[i]t is logically impossible to maximize in more than one
dimension at the same time.”45 This concern arises where directors struggle
to find an appropriate balance between competing interests, which may lead
to less efficient outcomes than directors who pursue shareholder value singlemindedly. However, such a concern is less applicable to shareholder value
maximization than it is to a scenario where directors can engage in
stakeholder pluralism, that is, where stakeholder interests can be pursued
alongside shareholder wealth as a legitimate end-goal. The duty of directors
currently operable in Delaware does not accept that non-shareholder interests
are themselves an end-goal, but rather simply a means to the end of creating
shareholder wealth. This is compounded by the fact that shareholders can
instigate claims on behalf of the corporation.46 The other stakeholders are not
themselves empowered to sue for breaches of these duties, even if directors
have considered their interests when deciding business strategy. Shareholders
may be unhappy with how directors integrate the interests of stakeholders
into their business strategy. The widened scope of directorial discretion for
integrating stakeholder interests may in turn create more opportunities for
shareholder dissatisfaction. However, provided that directors are engaging in
a good faith consideration of stakeholder interests towards a rational business
purpose benefiting shareholders, they will remain shielded by the business
judgment rule. Accordingly, any dissatisfied shareholders would struggle to
successfully claim disloyalty on the part of the director. While directors may
understandably be cautious over the risk of suit or internal challenge through
shareholder meetings,47 this caution would not be so significant as to prevent
good faith business decisions from directors that consider the wider interests
of stakeholders.

45. Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective
Function, 7 EUROPEAN FIN. MGMT. 297, 300–301 (2001).
46. Lucian A. Bebhuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance,
106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 108–116 (2020).
47. For a discussion on these risks of suit and the caution of directors, see James D. Cox,
Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 745 (1984).
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A useful lens for examining the latitude afforded to directors is
Bainbridge’s view of director primacy 48 and his argument that creating a
wider scope of legitimate commercial strategy ensures the preservation of
Kenneth Arrow’s authoritarian decision-making in directorial conduct. 49
“[D]irector primacy accepts shareholder wealth maximization as the proper
corporate decisionmaking norm, but rejects the notion that shareholders are
entitled to either direct or indirect decisionmaking control.”50 Whether one
advocates or criticizes director primacy, one must recognize the rather
fundamental underlying concept of separation of ownership and control,51
without necessarily approving of its normative consequences.52 The value to
a director primacy analysis here is highlighting the implications for
corporations where directors are given increased latitude towards their
decision-making. It does not reach any value judgment on whether it is
preferable economically or socially to consider interests beyond those of
shareholders. Instead, what can be acknowledged through director primacy
is that the greater the deference for directors to consider stakeholder interests,
the greater the discretion enjoyed by the board, both generally and where the
board seeks to shield itself through the business judgment rule. Ultimately,
existing law does not afford unfettered discretion to directors. This means
that any asserted primacy of directors is not absolute. Non-shareholder
constituencies do not themselves enjoy a cause of action and shareholders
wealth maximization remains the objective of directors even if their path to
achieving this objective is varied.53

48. See STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, DIRECTOR PRIMACY: THE MEANS AND ENDS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2002), https://ssrn.com/abstract=330582; Bainbridge, supra note 32, at 111.
49. Kenneth Arrow’s seminal work on organizational decisionmaking defined two
basic decisionmaking structures: ‘consensus’ and ‘authority.’ Consensus is utilized
where each member of the organization has identical information and interests and will
therefore select the course of action preferred by all the other team members. In contrast,
authority-based decisionmaking structures arise where team members have different
interests and amounts of information. They are characterized by the existence of a central
agency to which all relevant information is transmitted and which is empowered to make
decisions binding on the whole.
Director Primacy, supra note 48, at 13–14; See also KENNETH ARROW, THE LIMITS OF
ORGANIZATION (1974).
50. Director Primacy, supra note 48, at 21–22.
51. See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
52. For a thorough review of director primacy, see Brett McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and
the Arrowian Moment: A Review of The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 34
DEL. J. CORP. L. 139 (2009).
53. Strine Jr., supra note 26, at 768.

2021]Rejection of Absolutist Duties as a Barrier to Creditor Protection 323
III. DIRECTOR’S DUTIES UPON INSOLVENCY: SHIFTS IN DUTY
AND DECISION-MAKING STAGNATION
Having established the interrelationship of the business judgment rule
and directorial consideration of wider constituency interests, consideration
must be given to the director’s tasks surrounding corporate insolvency. The
business judgment rule does not cease to apply when a firm is insolvent. The
next section of this Article will look at the moment upon which insolvency is
triggered and whether the business judgment rule may alleviate the
difficulties created by a bright-line understanding of insolvency.
A. DISCHARGE OF DUTIES UPON INSOLVENCY: THE UNDERLYING
RATIONALES
Delaware jurisprudence offers dual rationales for shifting fiduciary
protection upon insolvency. Either “‘[a]n insolvent corporation[‘s] property
may be administered . . . as a trust fund for the benefit of creditors’”—the
trust fund theory—or that “the directors owe fiduciary duties to the creditors
because the ‘residual claimants’ of corporate assets are the constituency to
which directors owe their allegiance [that being] after insolvency . . . the
creditors”—the residual claimant theory.54
In either instance, the goal for directors shifts and the ultimate pursuit of
shareholder wealth maximization may no longer be seen as the appropriate
objective for guiding their commercial strategy. Were the motivations of
directors to still pursue the wealth of shareholders in insolvency, directors
would be perversely incentivized to take increased risks on behalf of
shareholders who have nothing to lose and everything to gain, thereby
creating a race to the bottom.55 What this risk-taking amounts to will vary
between cases but in the extreme might mean outright gambling.56 Caselaw
assessing the status quo of constituencies in insolvency is particularly
reflective of how wider constituency recognition—with particular emphasis
on creditor interests—should be best invoked.57

54. Henry T. C. Hu & Lawrence Jay Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1323 (2007).
55. Paul Davies, Directors Creditor-Regarding Duties in Respect of Trading Decisions Taken
in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 7 EUROPEAN BUS. ORG. L. REV. 301 306 (2006).
56. “So what’s a desperate founder to do? Smith impulsively flew to Las Vegas and played
blackjack with the last of the company money. Amazingly, when he came back the next week, he
had turned the remaining $5,000 into $27,000— just enough for the company to stay in operation
for another week” discussing a Fedex executives risky behaviour approaching insolvency. See
M.H.C Bakker and R.J de Weijs Basic Introduction to Expected Value Analyses and Investments
Through the Corporate Form 13 (Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No.201904).
57. This view is particularly prevalent where the trust fund theory has found root. See, Gregory
V. Varollo & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of the Financially Troubled
Company, 48 BUS. LAW. 239, 250 (1992).
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One question that has arisen is whether creditor interests become the
singular focus of fiduciary consideration upon insolvency or comprise part
of a wider residual corporate interest.58 Where there is a shift to true “creditor
paramountcy,” the interests of an insolvent corporation “are in reality the
interests of the existing creditors alone,. . . directors must put the interests of
creditors before any other concern . . . and perhaps to the total exclusion of
others’ interests.”59 This approach may be favored by those averse to any
semblance of a two-masters problem as it transfers the entirety of fiduciary
protection to creditors.60 This would reduce the potential for directors acting
in bad faith to abuse their latitude were they to balance the interests of
shareholders and creditors. It would also reduce potential difficulties for
directors acting in good faith who struggle to strike a balance between
competing interests. However, as discussed below, this absolute shift is
particularly problematic since identifying the precise moment at which a
corporation becomes insolvent can prove challenging. Gheewalla and
Quadrant confirmed that creditor interests do not become paramount at
insolvency, but rather form part of a wider pool of interests that directors
must consider while navigating insolvency.61 This is because the duties of
directors remain owed to the corporation at all times even when the residual
interests in the corporation have changed due to insolvency. 62 Silberglied
rightfully noted:
The Gheewalla court recognized that upon insolvency, what is in the best
interests of the corporation often departs from what is in the best interests
of stockholders, noting that ‘[w]hen a corporation is insolvent . . . its
creditors take the place of the shareholders as the residual beneficiaries of
any increase in value.’ Thus, the directors’ duty is ‘to maximize the value
of the insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those having an interest in
it’-whether creditors or stockholders.63

Under this view, insolvency triggers the creation of an expansive residual
interest,64 which ameliorates concern of an absolutist model by rejecting a
significant shift between constituencies in favor of a consolidated

58. Quadrant Structured Prod. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 174 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2014); See Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns, Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34
n. 55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
59. Andrew Keay, Directors’ Duties and Creditors’ Interest, 130 LAW Q. REV. 443, 444 (2014)
(emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. See generally Quadrant, 102 A.3d 155; N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v.
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007).
62. Jared A Ellias & Robert Stark, Bankruptcy Hardball, 108 CAL. L. REV. 745, 761 (2020).
63. Russell C. Silberglied, Litigating Fiduciary Duty Claims in Bankruptcy Court and Beyond:
Theory and Practical Considerations in an Evolving Environment, 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 181, 194
(2015) (citing Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 103).
64. Hu & Westbrook, supra note 54, at 1323.
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consideration.65 This allows directors to balance the risks of further losses to
creditors and retains the possibility, real or remote, that the corporation can
return to a solvent position.
While the current approach forsakes the absolute shift that the trust fund
theory may suggest is necessary, endemic to both approaches is the difficulty
in identifying the trigger of insolvency. Under the Quadrant-Gheewalla
model of wider consolidated constituency consideration, there is an explicit
rejection of the court’s view in Credit Lyonnais 66 calling for increased
consideration of non-shareholder interests while approaching insolvency:
When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, the
focus for Delaware directors does not change: directors must continue to
discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by
exercising their business judgment in the best interests of the corporation
for the benefit of its shareholder owners.67

This suggests a strict dichotomy between pre- and post-insolvency,
which not only does little to mitigate the moral hazard of shareholder
orientation in nearing insolvency, but also restrains the capacity of directors
to gradually shift strategy relative to solvency. This is because shareholder
interests are viewed as primary prior to insolvency and the increasingly
salient risks to creditors should not be capable of ousting shareholders from
their dominant position. Accordingly, directors may struggle to
incrementally change strategy pursuant to the risks of insolvency if their
duties do not envisage any change prior to insolvency. As a result,
irrespective of whether post-insolvency directorial attention is afforded to
creditors alone68 or a consolidated body of residual claimants,69 the shift is
triggered at a bright-line threshold.
B. AFFIRMING BRIGHT-LINE INSOLVENCY: THE REJECTION OF
PRE-INSOLVENCY CHANGES IN DIRECTOR’S DUTIES
Delaware courts have rejected the notion that any alteration of fiduciary
duty occurs when the corporation is in the zone of insolvency, and thereby
affirming insolvency as the singular underlying metric for expanding
directorial consideration:
After Gheewalla, actual insolvency is the relevant transitional moment. Of
course, the point at which a corporation becomes insolvent remains

65. Id. at 1342 n.68.
66. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Comms, Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *34, n. 55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (standing for the proposition that the interests to
which a director should consider may change prior to insolvency, i.e., in the zone or vicinity of
insolvency).
67. N. Am. Cath. Educ, Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007).
68. Keay, supra note 59, at 444.
69. Hu & Westbrook, supra note 54, at 1342.

326

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 15

debatable, is difficult to perceive in real-time, and can only be determined
definitively by a court in hindsight. I suspect that when Chancellor Allen
spoke of “the vicinity [or zone] of insolvency,” [in Credit Lyonnais] he
intended to recognize these practical ambiguities, rather than to expand the
law.70

This not only rejects the zone of insolvency approach; it suggests that
Credit Lyonnais cannot serve as precedent for such an assertion.
Furthermore, in affirming the supremacy of a bright-line solvency and
insolvency dichotomy, this dictum identifies the difficulty that this model
creates—the ex-ante identification of insolvency. When a corporation faces
financial difficulty, it is exceedingly more difficult in the moment to identify
precisely when insolvency occurs than it is to identify insolvency in
hindsight. Discerning insolvency is problematic even in the abstract as it
lacks any singular or cohesive definition, an issue illustrated by Finch and
Milman:
A company is insolvent for the purpose of the law if it unable to pay its
debts. … There is, [however], no single legal definition of inability to pay
debts… The two main reference points regarding the inability to pay debts
are the “cash flow” and the “balance sheet” tests … [and] defining
insolvency at law is further complicated by the use of further tests … [such
as] if [the company’s] assets are insufficient for the payment of its debt and
other liabilities together with the expenses of winding up.71

This theoretical confusion does not help directors tasked with identifying
ex-ante when the insolvency threshold has been reached—a task capable of
definitive determination “by a court in hindsight.” 72 This difficulty in
identification may hamper directorial decisiveness at a crucial moment when
directors may be unsure of the propriety of any given strategy in light of the
potential expansion of protected residual claimants.
C. THE UNCERTAINTY OF INSOLVENCY—BRIGHT-LINE OR
OTHERWISE
Uncertainty surrounding the determination of insolvency has contributed
to reluctance in recognizing a threshold triggering the point at which a
corporation enters the even vaguer zone of insolvency.73 It has been argued
that the difficulties in defining the scope of this zone and using such a vague
trigger to determine when directors must begin balancing interests may

70. Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin 102 A.3d 155, 174 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2014).
71. VANESSA FINCH & DAVID MILMAN, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: PERSPECTIVES AND
PRINCIPLES, 119–21 (3rd ed. 2017).
72. Quadrant Structured Prod. Co. v. Vertin 102 A.3d 155, 174 n.4.
73. See Simon Passfield, When Creditors’ Interests Intrude: The Effect of Doubtful Solvency on
Directors’ Duties, GUILDHALL CHAMBERS 176 (2013).
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discourage board action. 74 Keay acknowledged the acute difficulty in
describing the zone of insolvency:
Although insolvency may suffer from imprecision, prescribing the
triggering of the duty when the company is near to insolvency suffers even
more from that problem, for it is impossible in many situations to say from
what point a company is nearing insolvency, except where one is viewing
the company’s dealings ex post facto.75

While this skepticism supports Delaware courts’ rejection of changing
duties pre-insolvency,76 it may equally overlook that expansive constituency
consideration pre-insolvency does not necessarily entail discerning any
bright-line threshold for the zone of insolvency akin to that demanded by
stricter insolvency standards. Instead, one may expect an appreciable margin
of conduct that is deemed acceptable in its proportionality either by the courts
ex-post or the board ex-ante—with the choice between the two being a
question of how duties are framed and how the business judgment rule
operates.
D. THE PERVERSE INCENTIVIZATION OF SHAREHOLDERS
APPROACHING BRIGHT-LINE INSOLVENCY
As it stands now, “the focus for Delaware directors does not change”
until the bright-line threshold is crossed, directors face a moral hazard in
having to abide by shareholder incentives even where those incentives
become perverse when approaching insolvency:
Once the shareholders’ equity has been dissipated, or has been reduced to
a very low level and there is no prospect of its being rebuilt through the
company’s established business model, the incentive for the company
controllers (if acting in the shareholder interest) is to take on excessively
risk projects, for their attention can focus exclusively on the potential upside
of decisions.77

74. Both academic and judicial discourse offer various definitions for the zone of insolvency
ranging from the zone of insolvency, financial distress, doubtful insolvency to mere financial
difficulty. These have arisen in a multitude of common law jurisdictions and are well exemplified
in Delaware and the United Kingdom. Finch & Milman, supra note 71. See also Colin Gwyer &
Associates Ltd. v. London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd. [2002] EWHC 2748, [74]. ; City of London
Group Plc. v. Lothbury Financial Services Ltd. [2012] EWHC 3148, [54]; Re Idessa (UK) Ltd (In
Liquidation) [2011] EWHC 804.
75. Andrew Keay, The Director’s Duty to Take into Account the Interests of Company
Creditors: When Is It Triggered?, 25 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV. 315, 327 (2001).
76. Shifting fiduciary duties within the zone of insolvency was contemplated in the Credit
Lyonnais case. However, the subsequent judgments in Gheewalla and Quadrant make it clear that
such an approach does not form part of the accepted Delaware jurisprudence. See Credit Lyonnais
Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns, Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613; N. Am. Catholic
Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007); Quadrant Structured
Products v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 174 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2014).
77. Davies, supra note 55, at 306 (emphasis added).
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Preventing the potential negative consequences of this perverse incentive
has been a key rationale behind the shift away from strict shareholder
primacy at insolvency. Importantly however, both the trust fund and residual
claimant approaches do not fully prevent directors from acting on this
perverse incentive. Instead, it remains possible for directors to engage in
overly risky activity as the corporation approaches but has not yet reached
insolvency. Approaching insolvency,78 the potential benefit of risky behavior
likely outweighs the risk to shareholders whose equity is already nearly
dissipated. Additionally, risky behavior is more dangerous pre-insolvency
when directors have more resources available to facilitate reckless corporate
activity. 79 By definition, when the corporation’s condition may have
degraded prior to insolvency, there are some resources left which a director
acting under this perverse incentive could utilize towards turning the
corporation around, even where the likelihood of success remains remote.
Once a corporation has reached insolvency, directors are likely less capable
of utilizing the resources of the corporation in a risky manner because the
resources may have been depleted.
Yet, there may be directors who would prefer to no longer prioritize
gains-making for the benefit of shareholders in order to prevent undue losses
from being incurred by creditors. These directors may be concerned that were
they to do so prior to outright insolvency, they may find themselves acting
contrary to their duty of loyalty unless they can argue that the risks are
ultimately undesirable for the shareholders as well. There are instances where
the odds of taking such risks will not be favorable to shareholders, namely
where the taking of a risk would dissipate any remaining equity value with
only a remote chance of positive return. There will nevertheless be difficult
cases wherein the likelihood of success is less clear and directors find
themselves under significant pressure. Further difficulties may arise for
directors when contending with different types of creditors. While certain
creditors are assumed capable of contracting for their assumed risk, creditors
may either not anticipate certain shifts in the corporation’s risk profile80 or
may not be capable of adjusting for risk—a trait often assigned to employees

78. No singular test exists to identify the zone or vicinity of insolvency; however, variations
include where there is “no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation.” COMPANY LAW
REVIEW STEERING GROUP, FINAL REPORT, Vol 1 (London, Department of Trade and Industry
2001) Ch. 3: Corporate Governance; see also, Rao, Sokolow & White, Fiduciary Duty a la
Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on Corporate Governance in a Financially-Distressed Firm,
22 J. CORP. L. 53, 65 (1996); Jonathan Rickford, Reforming Capital, 15 EUROPEAN BUS. L. REV.
919, 977 (2004).
79. “The possibility of insolvency can do curious things to incentives, exposing creditors to risks
of opportunistic behavior and creating complexities for directors” Credit Lyonnais, No. 12150, 1991
WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (emphasis added).
80. See LOUISE GULLIFER & JENNIFER PAYNE, CORPORATE FINANCE LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY [3.2.2.2] (3rd ed. 2020).
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or tortfeasors. 81 As such, there are numerous conflicting pressures for a
director that apply not just past insolvency, but also as insolvency is looming.
The extremity of this bright-line shift in duty may exacerbate this
perverse incentive because the perception of impending insolvency also
creates a perception of an impending loss of shareholder pre-eminence,
whether by an absolute shift in duties, or as recently confirmed, an inclusion
of creditors within the residual claimant class. 82 Shareholder recklessness
may therefore derive not only from their financial incentive, but also their
incentive to retain sole fiduciary attention. While this issue can arise in both
a trust fund shifting model83 or a residual Gheewalla-Quadrant model,84 the
former, where the interests of creditors become paramount at insolvency,
represents a more extreme shift from the shareholder’s perspective. However,
the position in Gheewalla and Quadrant makes it clear that upon insolvency
the considerations of directors are to a widened pool of interest holders,
including but not limited to creditors. Under this approach, the extent to
which directors feel the need to prioritize shareholders to the undue detriment
of others prior to insolvency may dissolve because the interests of
shareholders are still valid following insolvency. Therefore, the extent to
which these models may compound the perverse incentive of shareholders
may differ. Nevertheless, the inclusion of a bright-line threshold in both
models gives rise to the same moral hazard, exacerbating the pressure of a
board already tasked with identifying the threshold of insolvency ex-ante85
and thereby potentially discouraging directorial action until insolvency is
confirmed.86 It is therefore important for directors to enjoy some latitude not
simply in how they balance the interests of interested parties before and after
insolvency, but also in how they assess the financial condition of the
corporation. Such latitude can be made available through the business
judgment rule.

81. The distinction between adjusting and non-adjusting creditors was introduced by Bebchuk
and Fried. See Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims
in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L. REV. 857 (1996).
82. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007);
Quadrant Structured Prod. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 174 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2014).
83. See Hu & Westbrook, supra note 54, at 1332–36.
84. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92; Quadrant,102 A.3d at 174 n.4.
85. “Of course, the point at which a corporation becomes insolvent remains debatable, is
difficult to perceive in real-time, and can only be determined definitively by a court in hindsight.”
Quadrant, 102 A.3d at 174 n.4.
86. The variance in tests for insolvency and the uncertainty this brings has arisen not only in
Delaware. Finch and Milman acknowledge the same difficulty in the United Kingdom, namely
within the long-term interest model under the Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 172. As such, “it is often
extremely difficult, in practice, to identify the point at which the value of a business falls below the
level needed to pay the creditors in full—and the law is not user-friendly in setting out the directors’
obligations at a given time.” Finch & Milman, supra note 72, at 596.
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IV. MITIGATING THE HOLD-UP PROBLEMS OF BRIGHT-LINE
INSOLVENCY THROUGH THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
One of the most significant comforts for anxious directors grappling with
the uncertain discernment of insolvency is their afforded deference under the
business judgment rule. This comfort stems not just from the deference given
to directors in considering the interests of stakeholders, but also in the
deference given to the assessments made by directors of the corporation’s
financial condition and whether the corporation has indeed become insolvent.
Directors afforded such a margin may better stave off the influence of
perverse incentives while avoiding the decision-making stagnation posed by
having to identify an objective insolvency threshold, which “can only be
determined definitively by a court in hindsight.”87 Otherwise, directors may
be reluctant to act in the interest of shareholders for fear that their duties have
already shifted, or vice versa. Instead, appropriate business strategy should
respond to the corporate financial condition within this deferential margin to
avoid an absolute jumping point. Since directors would never have to leap,
they would also avoid wasting time looking for the threshold that leads to
insolvency.
A. CONTRASTING THE SCOPE OF THE RULE BETWEEN SOLVENCY
AND INSOLVENCY
It is worthwhile to contrast how the operation of the business judgment
rule changes relative to solvency. Prior to reaching insolvency, “directors
must continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
shareholders by exercising their business judgment in the best interests of the
corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.”88
[Conversely] the directors of an insolvent firm may consider the interests of
creditors when assessing their fiduciary duty to the corporation, which in
some cases might justify taking a “less risky” course of action such as an
efficient liquidation. But, if the directors, in their business judgment, decide
to take “extreme risk,” that too will be protected by the business judgment
rule.89

As such, the business judgment rule at insolvency will support risky
shareholder-oriented stratagems 90 or decisions exhibiting marked
consideration for non-shareholder constituencies, such as efficient

87.
88.
89.
90.

Quadrant, 102 A.3d at 174 n.4.
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101.
Ellias & Stark, supra note 62, at 760–61.
An example of such a risky investment strategy was at issue in the Quadrant case and
ultimately the claims made against the risky nature of the investment strategy were dismissed. See
Quadrant, 02 A.3d at 174 n.2; See also Russell C. Silberglied, Litigating Fiduciary Duty Claims in
Bankruptcy Court and Beyond: Theory and Practical Considerations in an Evolving Environment,
10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 181, 199 (2015).
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liquidation. Importantly, legitimate business judgment at solvency need not
discount creditor interests entirely. The business judgment rule will protect
decision-making attributable “to a rational business purpose”91 with wider
constituency consideration insofar as it ultimately serves shareholder
interests. Accordingly, the business judgment rule expands at insolvency to
allow greater regard for non-shareholder interests. This may alleviate some
anxiety stemming from the uncertainties of insolvent business strategy by
signaling a degree of deference to directorial decision-making.
B. MISCONSTRUING INSOLVENCY AS A FAILURE TO CONSIDER
MATERIAL FACTS
In order to use the business judgment rule as a means of mitigating the
harsh bright-line approach by Delaware, directors determining whether a
corporation is indeed insolvent must be protected as a business judgment.
This may be contradicted by dictum which disapply the business judgment
rule in instances of a “grossly negligent process that includes the failure to
consider all material facts reasonably available.”92 Were the conditions of
insolvency or solvency perceived as objective material facts, then director
action would be open to challenge for the failure to consider them and for
pursuing a course of action favoring the incorrect conceptualization of
residual claimants.
One could counterargue that the requirement to consider all material facts
is a function of the business judgment rule’s disinclination to protect
omissions rather than acts.93 The business judgment rule, as developed in
Delaware, makes it impossible to treat wrongful omissions by directors on
par with their wrongful decisions. The Delaware rule generally does not
apply a standard to evaluate the substance of decisions by corporate directors.
Instead, it asks questions regarding the process of directorial decisionmaking.94
Failure to correctly identify ex-ante the corporate financial condition that
is discernible ex-post is not necessarily an instance of such omission, nor is
it incapable of procedural scrutiny by the judiciary. Provided the relevant
material that speaks to the corporation’s financial condition was considered,
arriving at an incorrect conclusion of solvency does not axiomatically entail
91. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (emphasis added).
92. Id.
93. “It is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See also Kaplan v.
Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refinery Corp., 126
A. 46, 49 (Del. Ch. 1924); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 368 (Del. 2006); In re Caremark Int’l Inc.
Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996).
94. Robert T. Miller, Wrongful Omissions by Corporate Directors: Stone v Ritter and Adapting
the Process Model of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 911
(2008).
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an omission of procedure or fact-finding. An example of this is illustrated in
Smith v. Van Gorkom where the board therein failed to obtain financial
advice.95 Miller succinctly summarized the court’s response to this failure:
The Delaware Supreme Court found that a board considering a sale of the
company had breached its duty of care because it failed to obtain a financial
study of the intrinsic value of the company—a kind of study that could have
been produced in a couple of days by the company’s financial advisors or
even its in-house financial professionals.96

The omission is therefore reliant not upon the substantive failure to
discern corporate value, but rather the underlying procedural failure to
compile and appraise the reasonable available or producible material facts
underpinning the evaluation by the board. For directors seeking to be shielded
by the business judgment rule, the requirement is not to draw correct
conclusions from the material facts, but rather to ensure that material facts
necessary to evaluate the financial condition of the corporation have been
considered. Accordingly, a Stone v. Ritter omission [where directors are held
to be in conscious disregard of their duties by failing to act] will not arise for
failing to correctly assess insolvency so long as the board erred in their
evaluation of the reasonably available and producible information and not in
a failure to produce this information.97
C. BURIDIAN’S ASS: THE DILEMMA AND DEFERENCE IN
SELECTING A TEST FOR INSOLVENCY
As one comes within the zone of insolvency, it becomes increasingly
difficult to characterize and identify the bright-line threshold of insolvency.
It is well documented that there remains no singular test for insolvency.98
Instead, in both Delaware and further afield, case-by-case iterations range
from insolvency99 and doubtful insolvency100 to mere financial difficulty.101
This variety is compounded by the academically fruitful but practically
enigmatic dichotomy between the balance sheet and cash flow tests. Under
the balance sheet test, a corporation is insolvent where it has liabilities in

95. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A. 2d 858, 863 (Del. 1985).
96. Miller, supra note 94, at 917.
97. Under Stone v Ritter, a director can be found in breach of their duty and not shielded by the
business judgment rule where they have failed to act at all, as a failure to act is in conscious disregard
of their duty to act in good faith. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 368 (Del. 2006); In re Caremark
Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. 1996); Miller, supra note 94, at 783.
98. The two most common broad tests for insolvency are cash-flow and balance sheet
insolvency. See Robert J. Stearn, Jr. & Cory D. Kandestin, Delaware’s Solvency Test: What Is It
and Does It Make Sense? A Comparison of Solvency Tests Under the Bankruptcy Code and
Delaware Law, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 165 (2011).
99. Colin Gwyer & Associates Ltd v. London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd [2003] 74 BCC 885.
100. City of London Group Plc v. Lothbury Financial Services Ltd [2012] 54 EWHC 3148.
101. Re Idessa (UK) Ltd (In Liquidation) [2011] EWHC 804.
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excess of the reasonable market value of its assets.102 Conversely, the cash
flow test considers a company insolvent where its “debts that [are] beyond
the debtor’s ability to pay as such debts matured,”103 and this inability to pay
may account for debts presently owed or debts that have not matured but
whose repayment the company cannot meet at a future date.104 Given this
myriad of standards, one cannot feasibly assert that they represent a singular
material fact representative of “solvency.” Instead, they offer a means to
derive conclusions from a multitude of underlying material facts.
Furthermore, even where courts with hindsight disagree with the ex-ante
judgment of the board regarding these insolvency metrics, mere disagreement
is a far cry from a finding of procedural gross negligence under the business
judgment rule.105
Importantly, were it desirable to prescribe a specific test for insolvency,
it should occur judicially or legislatively. For certain matters—whether in
regulatory compliance or litigation—the relevant insolvency metrics are
indeed prescribed. For instance, the Bankruptcy Code allows for the
avoidance of fraudulent transfers where a corporation was cash flow
insolvent.106 Conversely, when providing a general definition for insolvency,
the Bankruptcy Code prescribes a balance sheet test that defines insolvency
as the “financial condition such that the sum of such entity’s debts is greater
than all of such entity’s property, at fair valuation.” 107 While one can
envisage instances where such prescription is optimal, this does not arise
universally. For example, “[u]nder Gheewalla, . . . [a] plaintiff can plead
insolvency through allegations that meet either the ‘balance sheet’ test or the
‘cash flow’ test.”108 Affirming a multitude of solvency tests may be viewed
as a means of providing directors with guidance in the form of a more
102. Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr.v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 906 A.2d 168, 195 n. 74 (Del. Ch.2006).
103. This cash flow test is adopted for avoiding transfers where the debtor “received less than a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation; and . . . intended to incur,
or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as
such debts matured.” See 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(III) (2006).
104. See Robert J. Stearn, Jr. & Cory D. Kandestin, Delaware’s Solvency Test: What is It and
Does it Make Sense? A Comparison of Solvency Tests Under the Bankruptcy Code and Delaware
Law, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 165 (2011).
105. “Thus, directors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are interested or
lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be
attributed to a rational business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that
includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.” See Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (emphasis added).
106. “One provision of the [old] Bankruptcy Code incorporate[ed] two additional solvency tests.
Section 548, which addresses fraudulent transfers, provides that a transfer may be avoided if, among
other things, it was made while the debtor was unable to pay its debts as they came due. This is the
cash flow test. To apply the test, an overall assessment must be made of the debtor’s liquidity, which
then should be compared to projected debt payments.” Stearn, Jr. & Kandestin, supra note 98, at
173; See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(III)(2006).
107. 11 U.S.C. §101(32)(A)(2012).
108. Quadrant Structured Prod. Co. v. Vertin, 02 A.3d 155, 174 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2014) (emphasis
added).
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comprehensive understanding of the corporation’s financial position.
Rickford illustrates the guiding comprehensiveness of having the balance
sheet and cash flow tests operate in tandem:
[I]t could be argued that the requirement for a solvency certificate adds
nothing to a test based on proper appraisal of the balance sheet… Arguably
it would leave directors with less guidance as a matter of practice than the
combined approach. The converse argument, for abandonment of the
general solvency requirement and reliance on the balance sheet alone,
clearly has serious disadvantages in terms of the signals to directors and the
dangers of undue reliance on the balance sheet, which by its nature cannot
fully portray the timing and degree of certainty of future cash flows and the
company’s flexibility.109

In those instances where courts do recognize a myriad of insolvency
metrics, how boards grapple with these tests and their interrelationship itself
becomes a question of business judgment. Otherwise, the flexibility and
guidance which Rickford advocates for becomes a framework of potential
pitfalls for the corporate board. It is here that one sees the importance that the
business judgment rule applies in the absence of material omissions of fact
or disregard of relevant information. Evaluating financial condition involves
both a choice of metrics by directors and the processing of material data.
Once one accepts that a business judgment of the corporation’s financial
condition is itself a decision shielded by the business judgment rule, one can
acknowledge that directors are incentivized to consolidate the financial
information and apply the relevant solvency tests. Without doing this, there
should be a material omission and the business judgment rule would not
apply. Accordingly, the business judgment rule can both facilitate directorial
decisiveness whilst encouraging informed decision-making through the
promise of protection.
D. THE RELATIVITY OF SOLVENCY AND INSOLVENCY
A model which avoids sole reliance on bright-line thresholds better
recognizes that acceptable directorial conduct cannot simply be placed within
internally homogenous categories as there is variance within those categories
themselves. Insolvency is not absolute, but rather can be improved or
worsened based on the degree of indebtedness. Although such a view has
faced conceptual challenges due to the argument that any losses below a
firm’s value reaching null is actually loss to parties external from the firm
itself.110 The zone of insolvency entails a spectrum of corporate conditions

109. Jonathan Rickford, Reforming Capital, 15 EUROPEAN BUS. L. REV. 919, 977 (2004).
110. See Michael Schillig, “Deepening Insolvency”—Liability for Wrongful Trading in the
United States?, 30 CO. LAW. 298 (2009) (detailing a conceptual analysis of the non-absolutism of
insolvency).
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between solvency and insolvency.111 Even solvency is not absolute, and an
overly solvent corporation potentially results from excessive caution failing
to maximize shareholder value. Presuming then that there should be some
absolutist shift in the duty at a precise moment of insolvency encourages this
fiction of neat categorization, which in turn propagates the myth of precisely
identifiable thresholds which dictate expected board behavior. Therefore,
rejecting absolutism not only better aligns with acceptable board conduct, but
it also better recognizes that directors conduct the affairs of the business in
light of the relative financial position of the company based on how solvent
or insolvent the company is.
1. The Existing Recognition of Relativity: Deepening
Insolvency and Wrongful Trading
The need to adopt a relativist understanding of the degrees between
solvency and insolvency is clearly exemplified by the [at times controversial]
recognition of deepening insolvency principles across the corporate law of a
myriad of American states. 112 Deepening insolvency recognizes liability
“where the defendant’s conduct, either fraudulently or even negligently,
prolongs the life of a corporation thereby increasing the corporation’s debt
and exposure to creditors.” 113 Initially it was conceptualized as an
independent tort, 114 but has since largely been subsumed into a fiduciary
ambit that informs the appropriate directorial duties in instances where the
affairs of an insolvent corporation are managed in manners which deepen the
extent of corporate insolvency.115 The latter approach, articulated in In re The
Brown Schools,116 is perhaps preferable as the former tortious model imposes
direct liability upon directors separate from and in potential misalignment
111. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); Mark Arnold, Directors’ Duties in the Zone of
Insolvency: Recent Developments, SOUTH SQUARE DIGEST 46 (2015).
112. See Trenwick Am. Litig. v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 204–207 (Del. Ch. 2006)
(rejecting the deepening insolvency theory); In re Glob. Serv. Grp., LLC, 316 B.R. 451, 457–459
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (also rejecting the deepening insolvency theory).
113. In re LTV Steel Co. Inc., 333 B.R. 397, 4211 (Bankr. N.D Ohio 2005); Smith v. Arthur
Andersen LLP, 421 F. 3d 989, 1004 (9th Cir. 2005).
114. This was first recognized as an independent cause of action in Pennsylvania tort law for
where “[t]he fraudulent and concealed incurrence of debt… causes damage to corporate property.”
See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 351 (3d Cir.
2001).
115. See In re LTV Steel Co., Inc., 333 B.R. 397, 421 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005); Smith v. Arthur
Andersen LLP, 421 F.3d 989, 1005 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Lawrence A. Larose, Samuel S. Kohn
& Alexandra B. Feldman, Deepening Insolvency – Is The Newest Tort Dead?, 3 INT’L CORP.
RESCUE 352, 361 (2006).
116. In re The Brown Sch., 386 B.R. 37, 48 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008); see In re Worldwide
Wholesale Lumber, Inc., 378 B.R. 120, 127 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007); Dan Schechter, Although Trustee
Cannot Assert Separate Claim for Deepening Insolvency, Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty May
Be Based on the Same Type of Conduct [In re The Brown Schools (Bankr. D. Del.).], COMM. FIN.
NEWS. 39 (2008).
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with117 the duties of directors solely owed to the corporation.118 Acting in
accordance with the duty to the corporation, directors’ duties may be
discharged “at the expense of others” without constituting a breach.119
2. Difficulties in Contemporaneous Bright-Line and Relativist
Approaches.
Irrespective of whether deepening insolvency is operative as an
independent tort or subsumed within a fiduciary ambit, the settled recognition
that worsening the insolvent state of a corporation may breach the director’s
duties affirms the underlying legal acceptance of the relativity of insolvency.
It is certainly the model of fiduciary subsumption which relies more heavily
on the relativity of insolvency. This is because the direct tortious model
compensates losses to corporate participants, conceptualizing the claim by
reference to their personal losses as insolvent trading continues and the
corporation’s financial position worsens. Where a corporation is insolvent,
the residual value in the corporation has dissipated but individual creditors
are susceptible to further injury where insolvency deepens as creditors should
receive a share pari passu of the remaining assets. Thus, the injury to
creditors by the further diminishing of assets would provide a conceptually
useful basis for deepening insolvency claims were such claims directly
actionable by creditors. However, where deepening insolvency operates
within the ambit of director’s duties, the imposition of liability is only
conceptually tenable where corporate solvency is conceived in relative rather
than absolute terms since losses examined are solely those of the corporation
and the incurrence of its worsening insolvent state disregards external or
reflective losses.120
Were insolvency to be conceived as reaching a null value without further
reduction—a conceptualization likely imputed from the extinguishment of
share value—the parameters of deepening insolvency would find little
application. In rejecting this strict imputation of share value as corporate
value, deepening insolvency recognizes instead that “the corporate body is
ineluctably damaged by the deepening of its insolvency, through increased

117. “What is in the interests of current shareholders who are sellers of their shares may not
necessarily coincide with what is in the interests of the company. The creation of parallel duties
could lead to conflict. Directors have but one master, the company.” Dawson Int’l plc v. Coats Paton
plc [1989] BCLC 233.
118. In re The Brown Sch., 386 B.R. 37, 48 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008); In re Worldwide Wholesale
Lumber, Inc., 378 B.R 120, 126–27 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007).
119. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc, 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del Ch. 1986).
120. Reflective losses refer to losses to parties which are reflective of a loss suffered by the
company itself. Principal among these is the diminution of share value brought about by some harm
directly occasioned upon the company. See Alan Koh, Reconstructing the Reflective Loss Principle,
16 J. CORP. L. STUDS. 373 (2016); Charles Mitchell, Shareholders’ Claim for Reflective Loss, L.
QUARTERLY REV. 457 (2004).
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exposure to creditor liability.”121 Given that Delaware has sounded the “death
knell” for independent claims in favor of fiduciary subsumption, it is clear
that the operation of a director’s duty has become increasingly underpinned
by an explicitly relativist understanding of insolvency.122
Using a bright-line insolvency trigger would create issues with imposing
liability for deepening the insolvent state of a corporation. Prior to reaching
bright-line insolvency, directors acting in shareholders’ interests may be
incentivized to take risks that they would be restricted from taking past the
bright-line. Therefore, avoiding a bright-line model means directors would
not be contemporaneously grappling with determining the precise moment of
insolvency ex-ante and concerns over deepening insolvency; a failure to
correctly ascertain to whom duties were owed at a particular moment would
trigger board liability. Not only is identifying the precise moment which
triggers insolvency often unclear ex-ante, but it also may overlook the fact
that major negative actions taken prior to insolvency can result in an even
worse insolvent financial condition than minor negative actions taken
following insolvency. This is because a risky but ultimately tolerated course
of action prior to insolvency may result in deeper insolvency than a course of
action taken in insolvency that may be challenged for deepening
insolvency.123 The differing propriety of risk appetites that may be envisaged
before and after a bright line fails to adequately reflect the relative extent of
insolvency that the courses of action allowed by these risk appetites may
incur. Furthermore, any awareness of impending insolvency and associated
restrictions on risk-taking derived from deepening insolvency and its
equivalents may compound the already perverse incentive of boards to act
riskily since their temporal window to hedge is significantly narrowed and
the negative implications for hedging outside that window are notably
bolstered. Therefore, a wider appreciation of solvent relativism that considers
both improving solvency as well as deepening insolvency may alleviate these
incentives prior to any bright line while also enabling potential corporate
recovery.
3. Informing Decision-Making through Continuous and
Relative Metrics
Where business judgment becomes less myopic in its focus on brightline insolvency, increased emphasis may be placed upon metrics such as cost
121. Look Chan Ho, On Deepening Insolvency and Wrongful Trading, 20 J. INT’L BANKING &
FIN. L. 426 (2005).
122. Michelle M. Harner and Jo Ann J. Brighton, The Implications of North American Catholic
and Trenwick: Final Death Knell for Deepening Insolvency? Shift in Directors’ Duties in the Zone
of Insolvency?, 2008 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 1, 7 (2008); see also Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr. v. Ernst
& Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 174–75 (Del. Ch. 2006).
123. See Ian T. Mahoney, The CitX Decision: Has the Tort of Deepening Insolvency Gone
Bankrupt, 52 VILL. L. REV. 995 (2007).
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of equity or debt to estimate the impact of those decisions upon residual
claimants. Increases in cost of capital are not fatal to a decision since cost
fluctuations are subject to externalities, trade-off theory,124 and adjustment
by incoming investors. 125 Ultimately, the reliance on such metrics is
something one would expect from directors already. Not only does it form
good business practice, but failure to do so may signal irrational or grossly
negligent behavior on the part of the director. 126 In such instances, the
director would lose protection that is otherwise afforded by the business
judgment rule. 127 As such, utilizing these metrics makes both sound
commercial and legal sense for directors. However, while these metrics may
provide useful guidance for the internal decision-making of directors, their
efficacy may be stymied where the legal framework fails to appreciate the
relativity of solvency and holds directors to a bright-line standard for
appreciating when the firm has crossed the threshold between solvency and
insolvency.
E. MAINTAINING DIRECTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF
INFERENCES IN EX-POST JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
One may question whether the business judgment rule as presented thus
far would represent too much a dereliction of courts’ supervisory role. It is
evident however that courts do not omit evaluation of corporate financial
condition in favor of blind allegiance to a board’s presumptively sound
business judgment. Instead, courts will discern a corporation’s financial
position with hindsight and make inferences as to the motivations and
considerations of the board at the time.128 Inferences may be drawn in both
positive and negative forms, thereby either bolstering the business judgment
rule or serving to rebut its presumption. In Shlenksy “the court in fact posited
several legitimate business reasons for Wrigley’s conduct … for example that
‘the effect on the surrounding neighborhood might well be considered by a
director’” without requiring that this motivation actually be evidenced by the
directors. 129 Courts may equally make inferences as to insolvency. “In
124. Anila Cekrez, A Literature Review of the Trade−Off Theory of Capital Structure, ILIRIA
INT’L REV. 125, 128–30 (2013).
125. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 81, at 864–67; see also Edward Rock, Adapting to the New
Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1927–30 (2013).
126. The standard laid out in Brehm v. Eisner states that directors may be grossly negligent for
failing to account for material facts reasonably available. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264
n.66 (Del. 2000); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 90 (2004).
127. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 282-284 (2000).
128. It is already well established in this Article that courts are aware that their determination of
insolvency is the truly definitive one. “[A]ctual insolvency is the relevant transitional moment. Of
course, the point at which a corporation becomes insolvent remains debatable, is difficult to perceive
in real-time, and can only be determined definitively by a court in hindsight.” Quadrant Structured
Prods. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 174 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2014).
129. Bainbridge, supra note 32, at 90 (quoting Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (1968)).

2021]Rejection of Absolutist Duties as a Barrier to Creditor Protection 339
Trenwick, then-Vice Chancellor Strine … held that the complaint had not
adequately pled facts supporting a rational inference that the subsidiary …
was insolvent.”130 Conversely, in Quadrant, the allegations “support[ed] the
inference that [the controller] had reasonable cause to believe that [the
corporation] was insolvent.” 131 However, these inferences are clearly not
intended to supplant directorial judgment as to whether insolvency existed,
even though that fact may be most evident to a court ex-post. Instead, the
inferences speak to the rationality of the ex-ante appraisal and subsequent
conduct of board members. This approach is unsurprisingly deferential and
certainly the preferable tact at mitigating strategic hold-up approaching
insolvency.
F. CONCEPTUALIZING ACCEPTABLE BUSINESS JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF ENFORCEMENT
Essential to the above centrality of the business judgment rule is the fact
that in guiding boards’ attempts to enact business strategies while faced with
the risk of a change in their duties, one should not simply frame matters in
terms of internal decision-making, but rather as a question of enforcement.
Legal realism argues that, in examining “complex legal orders that comprise
more than the law enacted by the state,” 132 one should consider not just
blackletter law but also law-in-action. 133 Indeed, through the prism of
enforcement intensity, one can acknowledge that boards may already reach
judgments regarding the likelihood of enforcement. Accordingly, boards may
weigh the overall corporate or personal benefits to breaching duties owed to
claimant constituencies where retributive enforcement is not guaranteed.134
Even where boards act contrary to duties owed at either side of the brightline, barriers to enforcement may act as a countervailing factor to this
fiduciary derogation and thereby allow directors to make ex-ante judgments
on strategies they perceive as preferable.135 Barriers to enforcement may be
endogenic to corporate structure, namely coordination costs for shareholders
and costs to litigation, 136 derivative or otherwise. Endogenic factors are

130. Quadrant Structured Prods. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 191 (Del. Ch. 2014).
131. See id. at 197.
132. Jean-Louis Halpérin, Law in Books and Law in Action: The Problem of Legal Change, 64(1)
ME. L. REV. 46, 46 (2011).
133. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action: The Problem of Legal Change, 44 AM.
L. REV. 12 (1910).
134. This reflects the overall doctrine of efficient breach. See generally Gregory Klass, Efficient
Breach, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT 362 (Gregory Klass, George Letsas
& Prince Saprai eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014).
135. See Jennifer G. Hill and Matthew Conaglen, Directors’ Duties and Legal Safe Harbours: A
Comparative Analysis (ECGI, Working Paper No. 351, 2017).
136. See Armour et al., Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the
UK and US, European Corporate Governance Institute (Feb. 13, 2009),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1105355.
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however less likely to be immediately evident in legal norms.137 Once boards
account for these countervailing considerations, they may engage in
economically rational deviation138 by assuming an otherwise sound business
judgment and bearing the inherent risk of breach mitigated by enforcement
barriers.
Where the risks posed to directors by bright-line insolvency are
ameliorated by the business judgment rule, directorial appreciation of those
endogenic and exogenic factors influence their appraisal of enforcement
intensity. For instance, litigation costs for individual claimants are weighed
against an altered probability of successful suit alongside the benefit to a
potential collective action given that proceeds from these suits are typically139
returned to the corporation, even where litigation costs are not borne
collectively. 140 This presents an added difficulty for shareholders when
weighing up litigation because while they may only be interested in their own
potential benefit, the likelihood of successful litigation may depend on some
engagement between shareholders as a collective. Equally, claimant
coordination may differ between a small number of institutional creditors and
a dispersed shareholder body. These factors exist independent of the
fiduciary regime itself and will vary circumstantially. Nevertheless, when
these factors are taken together with expansive deference given to business
judgment, then the board may feel that legal challenges are less likely to arise.
This formalized deference to business judgment coupled with the factual
unlikelihood of challenge means that directors can be cognizant of this
latitude as a balm to the uncertainties they face around insolvency.
It is worth iterating why having the business judgment rule in this
instance ameliorates concerns for directors. Provided the case meets the

137. Like applicable standards of judicial scrutiny against the business judgment rule, for
example.
138. The economic rationality for breaching fiduciary duties may arise in relation to providing
benefit to other constituencies. The classic example of this is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W.
668 (Mich. 1919). See also Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial
Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT’L L.
J. 129, 142–143 (2009). However, one must also acknowledge that such derogations from fiduciary
alignment may be an economically rational means for boards to acquire personal benefits. For
analyses of where these costs arise, See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs
of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 863 (2013); Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate
Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767 (2017).
139. Proceeds of suit for breaches of fiduciary duty are typically owed returned to the company
and therefore divided between corporate beneficiaries However, there are also the exceptional
circumstances wherein duties are owed to individuals, the breach of which result in individualised
proceeds of suit. See Philip Rawlings, Reinforcing Collectivity: The Liability of Trustees and the
Power of Investors in Finance Transactions, 23 TRUST L. INT’L 14 (2009).
140. See Moverly-Smith & Murphy, Challenges to Collective Action Clauses: Can any Parallel
be Drawn With Unfair Prejudice Petitions and Oppression of the Minority?, 8 J. INT’L BANKING &
FIN. L. 479 (2012).
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business judgment rule requirements,141 the burden of proof shifts away from
directors and onto complainants. Accordingly, where a plaintiff “fails to meet
her burden of establishing facts rebutting the presumption, the business
judgment rule, as a substantive rule of law will attach to protect the directors
and the decisions they make.” 142 This shift in onus is not automatically
inherent to the business judgment rule. Certain regimes, particularly outside
the US which offer business judgment rule equivalents, retain the burden of
proof on directors to demonstrate good faith or exhibit informed decisionmaking.143 The extent to which onuses should legitimately shift is reflective
of the dichotomy between the business judgment rule as a standard of liability
and a doctrine of abstention, the latter possessing greater capacity for shifting
onuses away from directors.144 The standard of liability model may be more
naturally qualified in ambit, whether that means “the business judgment rule
shields directors from liability so long as they act in good faith … [or] simply
raises the liability bar from mere negligence to, say, gross negligence or
recklessness.” 145 Conversely, a general doctrine of abstention results in
courts abstaining “from reviewing the substantive merits of the directors’
conduct unless the plaintiff can rebut the business judgment rule’s
presumption of good faith,”146 thereby better facilitating a presumptive shift
in onus. While a blanket shift is not axiomatic to the business judgment rule,
Delaware’s strong presumption 147 may better facilitate decisive business
judgment; boards need not actively justify each decision or discernment of
solvency.
Boards would enjoy an expansive business judgment rule outside of selfdealing contexts. This means that courts would presume the director’s
141. The business judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Importantly the business judgment rule will
not presumptively apply in certain instances. For instance, the business judgment rule will not
immunize directorial omissions as it only applies to active decisions and judgments. See Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
142. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989).
143. An instance of this is the business judgement rule offered under German corporate law. Per
§93(1) Aktiengesetz, under which directors‚ shall be deemed not to have violated their duty if, at
the time of taking the entrepreneurial decision, they had good reason to assume that they were acting
on the basis of adequate information for the benefit of the company. However, unlike in Delaware,
this does not involve a shift in the burden of proof. This shift provides a critical synergy to the
proportionate fiduciary model advocated within this Article. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINER
KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANISATION Ch. 8 (2nd ed. 2007); see also Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez, Re-Examining the Law
and Economics of the Business Judgment Rule: Notes for its Implementation in Non-Us
Justifications, 18 J. CORP. L. STUDIES 417 (2018).
144. See Bainbridge, supra note 32, at 90.
145. Id.
146. Id.; see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000); Citron v. Fairchild
Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989).
147. “Essentially, the business judgment rule is a doctrinal vessel of judicial review into which
the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are fitted and subsumed.” Johnson, supra note 40, at 424.
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assessment of a corporation’s financial condition as tenable unless otherwise
demonstrated. Claimants can only successfully sue when they can overcome
the decision-making deference provided by the business judgment rule. This
will occur where claimants are able to establish that the board was grossly
negligent in its efforts to evaluate the financial condition of the corporation
or where the board failed to consider the relevant material facts necessary to
make a reasonable judgment as to the corporation’s financial condition.148
While courts can still make inferences as to the board’s undertakings,149 the
presumed legitimacy of directorial decisions concerning the company’s
financial position places directors in a favorable position to contend with
uncertainties around insolvency.
V. FACILITATING BUSINESS JUDGMENT THROUGH
RECONCILED CORPORATE CONSTITUENCIES
This Article has highlighted the challenge facing directors in identifying
bright-line insolvency and the potential for ambiguity over the extent to
which non-shareholder interests may inform corporate decision-making preand post-insolvency. The concerns of the former should be addressed under
analysis of the business judgment rule. The remainder of this Article aims to
shed some light on reconciling disparate constituency interests surrounding
insolvency to facilitate decisive business judgment. Particularly, as Quadrant
and other relevant cases affirm, both shareholders and creditors form part of
a wider residual class once the corporation becomes insolvent.150
Wider policy justifications of aggregate consideration at insolvency do
not necessarily extend to circumstances prior to insolvency. As such, while
the Gheewalla and Quadrant line of cases emphasize an expansive
conceptualization of residual claimants at insolvency, they equally reject
expansive non-shareholder consideration pre-insolvency. 151 At a doctrinal
level, the application of policy considerations—namely the moral hazard of
boards pursuing insolvent shareholder interest—may be distinguished at
solvency and insolvency since such considerations pre-insolvency may not
be convincing enough to countervail concerns of inter-constituency conflict.
148. This language is borrowed from the test laid out in Brehm. “Thus, directors’ decisions will
be respected by courts unless the directors are interested or lack independence relative to the
decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business
purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the failure to consider
all material facts reasonably available.” See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000)
(emphasis added).
149. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780–781 (Ill. App. 1968); Quadrant Structured
Prods. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 168–169 (Del. Ch. 2014).
150. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99–101 (Del.
2007); Quadrant Structured Prods. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 174 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2014).
151. “In a solvent corporation, the residual claimants are the stockholders. Consequently, in a
solvent corporation, the standard of conduct requires that directors seek prudently, loyally, and in
good faith ‘to manage the business of a corporation for the benefit of its shareholders.’” Quadrant,
102 A.3d at 174 n.4 (quoting Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101).
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This distinction best illustrates why judicial deference towards wider
constituency judgment is so markedly dependent upon insolvency, with nonshareholder consideration only possible as a limited Shlensky analysis preinsolvency.152 In either case, it may be necessary to affirm that constituency
interests are indeed reconcilable, especially since one cannot simply invoke
the policy objectives underlying corporate insolvency or bankruptcy
frameworks to all business judgments.153
Assuming constituency interests are manifestly irreconcilable is an
oversimplification endemic to strict shareholder primacy and the trust fund
theory approach to insolvency. 154 Courts have acknowledged that
constituency interests may inherently overlap.155 The countenance of such
commonalities adhere to the Gheewalla-Quadrant understanding of residual
interests given their acceptance of the expansive class of interests upon
insolvency. While such commonalities may not bridge the objective divide
within the debt-equity dichotomy, they may still enable directors to balance
the remaining competing interests within the hallowed ground of business
judgment.
A. ACKNOWLEDGING EXISTING DISPARITIES WITHIN INDIVIDUAL
CORPORATE CONSTITUENCIES
Although shareholders and creditors can hold comparable interests in a
corporation, there are likewise numerous disparities that can arise between
these groups. This may present significant challenges for directors seeking to
find balance between the interests of stakeholders, but we already expect
directors to balance competing concerns from within the shareholder class
and we should likewise expect a similar capacity on the part of directors to
balance competing concerns from a wider audience. Directors must consider
the interests of the class of shareholders,156 but this basic principle fails to
acknowledge an obvious fact—individual shareholders can have interests
contrary to those of the shareholder class.157 The existence of a unified class
interest is a legal fiction.

152. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d 776, 779–80 (Ill. App. 1968).
153. See Ellias & Stark, supra note 62, at 784–85; see also Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A.
Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV.
859 (2003).
154. Hu & Westbrook, supra note 54, at 1332–36.
155. An example of such overlap is seen in Fin. & Inv. Corp. wherein a party was rejected to be
a creditor seeking interest, but rather regarded as a preferred stockholder seeking dividend. See e.g.,
Fin. & Inv. Corp. v. Comm’r, 57 F.2d 444, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
156. “In no branch of the law has the equity court been more solicitous for the welfare of its wards
than in those controversies involving conflicting interests among stockholders and groups of
stockholders.” Norman D Lattin, The Minority Stockholder and Intra-Corporate Conflict, 17 IOWA
L. REV. 313, 331 (1932) (emphasis added).
157. See KRAAKMAN ET AL, ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 41 (3rd ed. 2017).
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It is therefore inconsistent to suggest that directors cannot consider
creditor interests as it protects the interests of one individual constituency
over others. Where the law refuses to shield a director for favoring one
individual over all individuals in question, it readily allows an individual
class—namely the shareholders—to garner absolute favor to the detriment of
all other classes. 158 This becomes contradictory when examining the task
entrusted to directors adhering to shareholder interests as a class. Directors
must assess, eliminate, and balance competing interests of shareholders to
fulfill duties owed to an artificially unified class.159 This acknowledges the
ability of directors to balance interests. Thus, it would be illogical to conclude
that directors are incapable of balancing competing interests simply because
the interests derive from competing groups or because the relevant interest
holders have divergent agendas.
B. REASSESSING THE ALLEGED IRRECONCILABILITY OF
SHAREHOLDER AND CREDITOR INTERESTS
While directors may be capable of balancing interests without inflicting
disproportionate prejudice upon a particular constituency, certain interests
are potentially incapable of reconciliation. 160 Where directors balance
interests inter-shareholder, they are obliged to discount interests
irreconcilable with the fictional class interest. 161 Therefore, if creditor
interests are irreconcilable with those of the core class, then directors remain
obliged to reject creditor influence upon corporate direction. Factors which
will be examined for their potential irreconcilability include: (i) duration and
extent of investment into the corporation, (ii) the residual nature of

158. “[C]ertain directors breached their duty of loyalty by ‘indifference to their duty to protect
the interests of the corporation and its minority shareholders,’ because their primary loyalty was
instead given to the interests of their employer [the majority shareholder].” In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 754 n. 452 (Del. Ch. 2005) (discussing the earlier case of In
re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holder Litig., 1989 WL 7036, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989)); cf.
Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557, 581 (Del. Ch. 2000).
159. ‘[W]hen a firm has more than one shareholder, the very idea of ‘shareholder wealth’
becomes incoherent. Different shareholders have different investment time frames, different tax
concerns, different attitudes toward firm-level risk due to different levels of diversification, different
interests in other investments that might be affected by corporate activities and different views about
the about the extent to which they are willing to sacrifice corporate profits to promote broader social
interests . . . These and other schisms ensure that there is no single uniform measure of shareholder
‘wealth’ to be ‘maximized.’” Stout, supra note 9, at 174.
160. This irreconcilability is one of the reasons against imposing a duty to consider creditors prior
to insolvency. “‘[T]here will be insoluble problems of reconciling conflicting interests’ of
shareholders and creditors if a duty to creditors applied other than where insolvency exists.”
ANDREW KEAY, COMPANY DIRECTORS’ RESPONSIBILITIES TO CREDITORS 226 (2007) (citing
Reginald Barrett, Directors’ Duties to Creditors, 40 MODERN L. REV. 226, 231 (1977)).
161. This goes back to the notion that directors are to act in the interests of the company by
reference of the interests of the shareholder class and not the divergent interests of individual
shareholders. See In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holder Litig., 1989 WL 7036 at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31,
1989); cf. Strassburger, 752 A.2d at 581.
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shareholder interests contrasted with the fixed value of creditor interests, (iii)
the values for shareholders and creditors under balance-sheet and cash flow
tests, (iv) the conflicting risk appetites of creditors and shareholders, (v)
general differences between shareholders and creditors in what they perceive
to be the ideal direction of corporate activity, (vi) the implications for
shareholders and creditors were the board obliged to liquidate, and (vii) the
differing contractual relationships which arise between shareholders and
creditors. Each of these factors illustrate that while balancing competing
interests is not always a simple task, it is a task that directors should
nevertheless be capable of undertaking.
1. The Comparative Duration of Shareholder and Creditor
Investment
Given the proprietary nature of shares and the role of shareholders as the
corporate organ, one may expect shareholdings to be more static than credit
instruments, which suggests shareholders have a more long-term perspective
on corporate activity.162 However, it is hardly reflective of modern practice
to view shareholding as much less static than credit agreements, particularly
where stock is publicly traded:
As far as protection goes, if the shareholders are unhappy with the
company’s performance and/or way that it is being managed, shareholders
are able to exit the company fairly easily by way of sale on the stock
exchange, and this might be seen as a major protection for shareholders.163

Shareholders outside of closely held corporations 164 enjoy a powerful
exit right which oftentimes reduces the durable connection of the shareholder
to the corporation. Furthermore, shareholders focus on managing a
diversified portfolio rather than on making individualized investments. 165
The focus of such shareholders or their investment managers is to maintain
their desired risk-and-return profile in their portfolios, which renders the
duration of their individual investments less consequential.166 The opposite
162. Legal regimes vary on the emphasis given to such long-term perspectives. While Delaware
does not mandate any such long-term view in the exercise of directorial duties, the United Kingdom
has gone further through the introduction of the Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 172(1), under which
“[a] director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.” See Virginia Harper
Ho, Enlightened Shareholder Value: Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder
Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 77–80, 92 (2010); Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Social Responsibility:
A Law and Economics Perspective, 17 CHAPMAN L. REV. 331, 342–46 (2014).
163. ANDREW KEAY, THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE 281 (1st ed. 2011).
164. See Eleonora Broccardo, Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Exit vs. Voice, EUROPEAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE (Aug. 1, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3671918.
165. See BS Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39
UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992).
166. Kastiel Kobi & Nili Yaron, In Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution to
Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55 (2016).
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may also hold true when a large or controlling stockholder faces greater
losses, which would give them greater interest in overseeing the board. “If a
controlling stockholder is merely mismanaging the business, she is injuring
herself as well as the other stockholders[,]” and the greater the investment
the greater this injury.167 This is equally true for creditor interests because the
greater their investment, the greater their losses will be upon insolvency.
Creditors wield even less internal power than that of a minority shareholder
as they are not a recognized corporate organ, except at insolvency and the
subsequent inception of a creditor committee in liquidation proceedings.168
Creditors may therefore be more concerned with corporate welfare than a less
interested shareholder. This is significant because there are shareholders
whose interests align more readily with those of creditors than with those of
outlier shareholders. Therefore, since the current model does not view the
inter-shareholder disparities as manifestly irreconcilable, it is unnecessary to
do so in an expansive approach.
2. Reconciling the Fixed Value of Creditors’ Interest and the
Fluctuating Value of Shareholders’ Residual Interest
The core of irreconcilable disparities between shareholders and creditors
is the nature of shareholder interests to have fluctuating residual value, which
contrasts with the fixed value of debt.169 A simplified perspective on this
disparity characterizes shareholders as the residual owners of the
corporation,170 yet “it is clear that shareholders hold no direct interest in the
assets of the corporation.”171 Instead, “shares are merely a piece of property
conferring rights in relation to the income and capital of the corporation”
residual to outstanding corporate liability.172 While this does not amount to
ownership of the corporation itself, the value of their residual income stream
will fluctuate between zero and any upward positive value; a stark contrast
to fixed creditor value. Despite shareholding not being strict ownership,
Easterbrook and Fischel attribute much of shareholders’ quasi-owner
governance rights, like voting rights, to the residual nature of their interest:

167. Paula J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder Fiduciary Duties, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 175, 195 (2004).
168. See 11 USC §1102 (2012).
169. “The right of ordinary shareholders to participate in the capital of the company is generally
limited to their entitlement to any surplus left over after all the liabilities have been paid, i.e., they
have no guarantee of any return on a winding up. They are the residual claimants of the company.
They take the lion’s share of the risk, but, in the good times, they will take the lion’s share of the
rewards.” LOUISE GULLIFER & JENNIFER PAYNE, CORPORATE FINANCE LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 2.2.1.1 (3rd ed. 2020).
170. Armour John, Deakin Simon & Konzelmann Suzanne J., Shareholder Primacy and the
Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance, 41 BRITISH J. INDUS. RELS. 531, 542 (2003).
171. GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 169, at 3.2.1.3.2.
172. Id.
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Voting exists in corporations because someone must have the residual
power to act (or delegate) when contracts are not complete. Votes could be
held by shareholders, bondholders, managers, or other employees in any
combination .... One might expect voting rights to be held by a small group
with good access to information—the managers. Yet voting rights are
universally held by shareholders, to the exclusion of creditors, managers
and other employees .... The reason is that shareholders are the residual
claimants to the firm’s income. Creditors have fixed claims and employees
generally negotiate compensation schedules in advance of performance.
The gains and losses from abnormally good or bad performance are the lot
of shareholders, whose claims stand last in line. As the residual claimants,
shareholders have the appropriate incentives..., to make discretionary
decisions. The firm should invest in new products, plants and so forth, until
the gains and costs are identical at the margin.173

The superior position of shareholders is attributable to their residual
interests in allowing their delegated authority, the board, to operate in a
discretionary capacity.174 As such, Fischel and Easterbrook conceive of the
residual and fixed natures of shareholder and creditor interests contributing
to disparities in board discretion.
Differences in shareholder and creditor value structures do not result in
irreconcilable differences at either side of insolvency. During solvency,
primary regard remains with shareholders with the board retaining discretion
over how to preferably satisfy shareholder interests while appreciating the
context of the company’s indebtedness. Since the value of residual interests
increase without any pre-defined growth limit, the directorial care required
for creditors’ interest is a subsumed aspect of shareholder value
maximization. Creditors have no interest in corporate gains past guaranteed
fixed value returns, and once those returns do not face undue risk, creditors
are not disadvantaged by the overarching pursuit of shareholder wealth.
Conversely, during insolvency, the shareholder’s pecuniary interest is
dissipated while creditors face the diminishment of their otherwise fixed
returns. Accordingly, credit value becomes residual175 and provides support
for the widened residual class affirmed in Quadrant.176 Naturally, the extent
to which an individual creditor is threatened depends upon any security held
by the immediate creditor or other creditors before unsecured pari passu is
173. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 67 (1991)
174. See Horst Eidenmüller, Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law, EUROPEAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE (June 23, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2799863.
175. When a firm has become insolvent, it is settled that under Delaware law the directors owe
fiduciary duties to the creditors because the residual claimants of corporate assets are the
constituency to which directors owe their allegiance. Before insolvency, the residual claimants were
the shareholders; after insolvency, they were the creditors. The fiduciary duty was never owed to
shareholders because of ownership, but rather because of their residual claimant status. Hu &
Westbrook, supra note 54, at 1321.
176. Quadrant Structured Prods. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 174 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2014).
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triggered.177 The incentive for retributive actions under breaches of duty rises
with this value at risk. However, this is offset by the potential for creditor
disinterest deriving from costs of collective action, namely coordinated
monitoring and enforcement, particularly where the outcome of incurring
these costs offers little risk reduction.178 Nevertheless, as insolvency deepens,
creditor detriment correspondingly worsens in relation to the extent of
insolvency, whereas the equity value plateaus at null value. This difference,
which is relative to the deepening insolvency analysis, provides a crux for
the challenge faced in reaching balanced business judgments.
3. Reconciliation of Fixed and Residual Values under
Competing Balance Sheet and Cash Flow Tests
It would be improper for the law to wholly disregard shareholder value
at the null value plateau of balance sheet insolvency, even though doing so
would garner a reconcilable test as seen in trust fund theory179 because the
law seeks to give regard to prospects of recovery. 180 However, a strict
adherence to the model that abandons shareholder interests under the trust
fund theory is difficult to reconcile when accounting for such prospects. This
gives rise to the conflicting dichotomy of strict balance sheet tests that
emphasize the null value plateau, and cash flow tests which account for future
potential recovery.181
As previously discussed, Delaware law declines from prescribing
definitive insolvency standards.182 The resulting friction in deciding which
test to apply means that “Delaware case law on solvency is confusing and
can lead to inconsistent results. Indeed, the precedent that a court chooses to

177. Mokal, Priority as Pathology: the Pari Passu, 60 CORP. L. J. 581, 616-620 (2000).
178. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

OF

CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 63–116 (1962); MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2009).
179. Neil Ruben, Duty to Creditors in Insolvency and the Zone of Insolvency: Delaware and the
Alternatives, 7 NYU J. L. & BUS 333, 335 (2010);
Mohammad R. Pasban, A Review of Director’s Liabilities of an Insolvent Company in the U.S and
England, JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW 33 (2001); Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808, 813
(Del. Ch. 1944).
180. “[T]he directors of an insolvent firm may consider the interests of creditors when assessing
their fiduciary duty to the corporation, which in some cases might justify taking a “less risky” course
of action such as an efficient liquidation. But, if the directors, in their business judgment, decide to
take “extreme risk,” that too will be protected by the business judgment rule.” Ellias & Stark, supra
note 62, at 745.
181. Delaware allows for both tests in insolvency. The cash flow standard that has emerged in
case law is that there is “no reasonable prospect that the business can be successfully continued in
the face thereof.” Stearn, Jr. & Kandestin, supra note 104. One such formulation also emerges in
the English Insolvency law context wherein corporate bankruptcy orders shall be made in respect
of a “a debt which the debtor has no reasonable prospect of being able to pay when it falls due.” See
Insolvency Act 1986 c. 45, § 271(1)(b).
182. Supra, Section IV(C).
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follow may be outcome determinative.”183 This same conflict arises between
the operation of both tests, which has created comparable difficulties in
similar jurisdictions like Australia 184 and the United Kingdom. 185 While
Gullifer and Payne argue that the cash flow test may be preferable where
jurisdictions lack any significant legal capital requirements,186 what remains
clear is a lack of judicial certainty in selecting the appropriate test. 187
Selecting in favor of a particular test may be synonymous with favoring a
particular interest group because each test sets the bright-line at a potentially
different marker. 188 This itself may be symptomatic of the overreaching
constituency conflict, with constituencies naturally pressuring for their
favored outcome.189
Granting deference to rational selection for insolvency tests may serve to
break this impasse. Insofar as creditors become the dominant concern past
balance sheet insolvency, directors can favor courses of action that improve
prospects of corporate recovery provided that said prospects are not so
remote as to be out of proportion with increased risk to creditors. Therefore,
such a test would enable bona fide attempts at recovery while
acknowledging the perverse shareholder incentive operable at the time.
Gullifer and Payne highlight this possibility: “[o]nce the shareholders’
funds in the company have been dissipated entirely, or at least reduced to a
very low level, it is in the interests of the shareholders to encourage
excessively risky projects.”190

In this regard, the business judgment rule can provide an avenue to
reconcile these tests with the conflict arising from residual and fixed interests
of corporate constituencies. This would give credence to the understanding
that while corporate rescue should be facilitated, corporate governance
should operate with a similar flexibility given that “the purpose of insolvency
law is not, however, to save all companies from failure.”191
183. Stearn, Jr. & Kandestin, supra note 104, at 166.
184. In the 2008 judgment of The Bell Group Ltd., Owen J indicated that the cash flow test is the
appropriate test for determining solvency. However, he added that the balance sheet test should not
be dismissed as irrelevant [as] “[i]n the light of commercial reality, all things considered, could the
company pay its debts as and when they become due? Such an approach includes the balance sheet
test.” Ryan Purslowe, Decisions in the Twilight Zone of Insolvency - Should Directors Be Afforded
a New Safe Harbour, 13 U. NOTRE DAME AUSTRALIAN L. REV. 113 117–118 (2011).
185. One can see the dichotomy of these two tests by comparing BNY Corporate Trustee Services
Limited v Eurosail-UK 2007- 3bl 28 (UK Supreme Court 2013) and Carman v Bucci [2014] EWCA
Civ 383.
186. GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 169, at 3.1.
187. See Rickford, supra note 109.
188. Stearn, Jr. & Kandestin, supra note 104, at 184.
189. See JD CULPEPPER, QUIET POLITICS AND BUSINESS POWER: CORPORATE CONTROL IN
EUROPE AND JAPAN Ch. 1 (2011); see also Mark J. Roe & Travis G. Coan, Financial Markets and
the Political Center of Gravity, 2 J. L. FIN. & ACCT. (2017); Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions
to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000).
190. GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 169, at 3.1.
191. FINCH & DAVID, supra note 76, at 596.
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4. Reconciling Risk Appetites Across Corporate
Constituencies
A notable dispute in the contended irreconcilability of risk appetites is
“the level of risk [one] is willing to assume.”192 This presumes that creditors
are risk adverse because the value of their investment is finite, unlike that of
shareholders. Therefore, creditors may influence a corporation to pursue “a
less risky business strategy because they believed a [riskier] strategy might
render the corporation unable to meet its obligations to its creditors.” 193
However, creditors are not wholly risk adverse because they diversify risk194
and “most lenders do not have an incentive to seek early repayment, and
would wish the lending relationship to go on for as long as possible if the
corporation is solvent.” 195 Therefore, since creditors do not reject risk,
creditor duties need not amount to an absolute duty to liquidate. Any
reconciliation of risk appetites should only account for shareholder appetite
being riskier than creditors and should not accept any conjecture that
creditors are wholly risk averse.
Furthermore, the contention that creditors and shareholders have
manifestly irreconcilable risk appetites overlooks the disparity in intershareholder risk appetite. For instance, Bainbridge notes that: “[t]hough
conventional finance theory assumes shareholders are risk adverse, rational
shareholders still will have a high tolerance for risky corporate projects
[since] the basic corporate law principle of limited liability substantially
insulates shareholders.”196 This in isolation suggests irreconcilability since
creditors have no such protection. However since “shareholders [and
creditors] can largely eliminate firm-specific risk by holding a diversified
portfolio,” 197 their risk appetites begin to converge. Of course, not all
creditors are engaged in sophisticated risk diversification (trade creditors for
instance),198 just as not all shareholders are diversified in their investment.199
It is however nonsensical to suggest creditors are fundamentally risk adverse
because all gainful corporate activity entails some form of risk, and without
such gain, a corporation cannot increase the value of the object of credit and
would therefore be unable to ensure repayment after fixed overheads.200 As

192. Joseph V. Rizzi, Rethinking Risk Management–Again, 23 COM. LENDING REV. 3, 5 (2008).
193. Ruben, supra note 179, at 335–336.
194. Samuel G. Hanson, M. Hashem Pesaran & Til Schuermann, Scope for Credit Risk
Diversification (Univ. of Cambridge, Faculty of Econ., Cambridge Working Papers in Econ. 0519,
2005). See also JONATHAN BECK & PETER DEMARZO, CORPORATE FINANCE 10.6 (4th ed. 2017).
195. GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 169, at 3.2.2.
196. Bainbridge, supra note 32, at 111.
197. Id. at 112.
198. Steve Knippenberg, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain: An Essay in Reply, Reprisal, or
Support?, 80 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1967 (1994).
199. Mara Faccio, Maria-Teresa Marchica & Roberto Mura, Large Shareholder Diversification
and Corporate Risk-Taking, 24 REV. FIN. STUDS. 3601 (2011).
200. BECK & DEMARZO, supra note 194, at Part 4.
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previously noted, these risk appetites diverge once the perverse
incentivization is triggered near insolvency. However, since this incentive
should be discouraged, deference to business judgment that happens to be
expressly averse to shareholder incentives may enable the use of creditor
interests and risk appetite as a tether on the deviant shift in shareholder
priority and appetite.
5. Reconciling the Seemingly Disparate Preferences in
Corporate Direction
An attribute which entails significant disparity between interested parties
is the desired direction of corporate activity. Through the prism of
generalized risk appetite, it is presumed that creditors seek a minimalized risk
contrary to profitability and shareholder maximization. Aside from the
discussed flaws to this over-simplification, this view overlooks that more
disparate business ideologies are accepted inter-shareholder.201
As a class, shareholders are presumed to primarily seek profit
maximization, yet disagreement in attaining this is inevitable. Short term
shareholders may only seek short-term gain. Furthermore, the diversity of an
individual share portfolio may favor a given course of action contrary to other
shareholders. This may influence not only general governance, but also the
desirability of derivative action and whether the recovery of gain from suit
outweighs litigation costs, the impediment to directorial decisiveness, and
damage to corporate reputation.202 Creditors conversely present a far more
unified front in that they solely pursue repayment, and accordingly, “[t]he
first main concern the creditor [has] is credit risk, that is, the risk of nonpayment.” 203 While this objective may be pursued in disparate means
depending on duration, type, and degree of credit, such divisions do not
contain the same scope of divisiveness capable in inter-shareholder conflict
because the latter arises within a core corporate organ.
What emerges is a noteworthy contradiction within corporate law.
Corporate law rejects creditor protection on grounds that this would unjustly
diversify pursued corporate objectives. 204 In doing so, it accepts division
within the shareholder class to such a degree that it amalgamates their
objectives into an artificial compromise. By finally acknowledging this
division, corporate law would not only be better equipped to tackle inter201. See Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 127; see
also Zsuzanna Fluck, The Dynamics of the Management-Shareholder Conflict, 12 REV. FIN. STUD.
379 (1999).
202. Arad Reisberg, Shareholders’ Remedies: The Choice of Objectives and the Social Meaning
of Derivative Actions, 6 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 227 (2005).
203. GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 169, at 2.3.1.3.
204. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance
1, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91 (2000); see also, D.J. Wood & R.E. Jones, Stakeholder Mismatching:
a Theoretical Problem in Empirical Research on Corporate Social Performance, 3 INT’L. J.
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 229 (1995).
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shareholder conflict, but also to adopt an expansive model that accounts for
constituency interests contrary to absolute shareholder maximization without
unduly restricting directorial discretion.
6. Rejecting the Allegation of Irreconcilability Stemming from
an Absolute Duty to Liquidate
One may argue that contemporaneous residual consideration of creditors
and shareholders is inconceivable because the duties owed to creditors
amount to a duty to liquidate the corporation. One might support this view
by reference to Production Resources Group, where the Delaware Court of
Chancery found that:
When a firm has reached the point of insolvency, … [t]he directors continue
to have the task of attempting to maximize the economic value of the firm.
The maximization of the economic value of the firm might, in
circumstances of insolvency, require the directors to undertake the course
of action that best preserves value in a situation when the procession of the
firm as a going concern would be value-destroying. In other words, the
efficient liquidation of an insolvent firm might well be the method by which
the firm’s value is enhanced in order to meet the legitimate claims of its
creditors.205

While certainly a moot point during solvency, 206 were the duty to
liquidate and preserve corporate value for creditors at insolvency the sumtotal of the duty owed to creditors residually, then directors may struggle to
reconcile this without corporate recovery aimed at shareholder value
maximization. As the corporation begins to approach insolvency, the risk
associated with corporate activity begins to shift towards creditors as there is
an increased likelihood that risky transactions will result in the nonrealization of creditor value. Again, upon insolvency, the role of directors is
not to achieve an optimal outcome or Pareto efficiency between
constituencies. 207 Instead, directors may be required to regard creditor
interests and act with a requisite degree of prudence rather than simply hedge
against greater returns for shareholders in a manner contrary to good faith or
rationality expected by the business judgment rule.
While deepening insolvency may prima facie suggest that boards should
liquidate as efficiently as possible to avoid worsening the corporate
205. Prod. Res. Grp. v. NCT Grp., 863 A.2d 772, at 790–91 n. 60 (Del. Ch. 2004).
206. See Davies, supra note 55, at 306.
207. “Resources are allocated in a Pareto-optimal fashion if and only if any further reallocation
of them can enhance the welfare of one person only at the expense of another. An allocation of
resources is Pareto superior to an alternative allocation if and only if no one is made worse off by
the distribution and the welfare of at least one person is improved. These two conceptions of
efficiency are analytically related in that a Pareto-optimal distribution has no distributions Pareto
superior to it.” Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
509, 512–13 (1980).
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condition, 208 it is notable that this doctrine is subsumed into directors’
duties 209 which in turn serves the expanded residual claimant class. 210
Furthermore, its underpinning as evidence of solvency’s relativity is not a
one-way perspective, as solvency can likewise improve:
This deepening insolvency principle should arrest the perverse incentive on
the part of the management mentioned above to continue insolvent trading
for as long as possible, and at the same time does not require them to
proceed to immediate liquidation as soon as there is any insolvency risk.211

It is accordingly apparent that not all insolvent trading is pursued in the
name of this perverse incentive. Indeed, Congress has supported the view that
a business is worth more to everyone alive than dead.212 As such, the scrutiny
of any business judgments will not infer an immutable expectation of
efficient liquidation, but rather an expectation that boards engaged ex-ante
with the competing policies of facilitating corporate recovery without
recklessly worsening financial integrity.
The UK framework demonstrates the difference between insolvent and
solvent consideration of creditor interests, particularly in its contrasts to
deepening insolvency. 213 Outside insolvency, directors must promote “the
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole” while
“hav[ing] regard [for] ... the company’s business relationships with
suppliers,” 214 otherwise labeled as creditors. This “regard” requirement is
notably less onerous than creditor consideration upon insolvency. Where a
director continues to trade wrongfully and “knew or ought to have concluded
that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going
into insolvent liquidation,” the director will “be liable to make such
contribution (if any) to the company’s assets as the court thinks proper.”215
Solvency considerations are therefore very much subsumed into a duty owed
solely to shareholders, not coming anywhere close to a duty to liquidate or
otherwise act with direct regard to creditors, whose interests are excluded
from the residual class until insolvency. This statutory dichotomy can apply
to the doctrinal underpinning of fiduciary scope to illustrate that the duty to

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Ho, supra note 121, at 428.
In re Brown Sch.. 386 B.R. 37, 48 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008); Schechter, supra note 116.
Quadrant Structured Prods. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 174 (Del. Ch. 2014).
Ho, supra note 121, at 428.
In re Glob. Serv. Grp. LLC, 316 B.R. 451, 460 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004); David C.
Thompson, A Critique of “Deepening Insolvency,” a New Bankruptcy Tort Theory, 12 STAN. J. L.
BUS. & FIN. 536, 550 (2007).
213. “Although developed in parallel and in ignorance of each other, both the deepening
insolvency theory and wrongful trading regime are animated by the desire to redress the perverse
incentives of the management of an insolvent firm.” Ho, supra note 121, at 433.
214. Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 172 (UK).
215. Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45 § 214 (UK).
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liquidate is not absolute, but rather a case-by-case efficiency concern,216 and
without absolutism, a creditor-oriented possibility of liquidation does not
manifestly contradict shareholder primacy such that directors may fulfil their
obligations across corporate constituencies.
7. Contractual Nexuses as a Guidance for Constituency
Reconciliation
While contract must inevitably play a crucial role in corporate relations,
it is a problematic substitute for fiduciary protection. Contract is often
proffered as an alternative to expansive fiduciary recognition217 by arguing
that contractual adjustment by creditors offsets risk sufficiently218 without
assistance from directors’ duties.219 On the other hand, “contract primacy”
preserves shareholder primacy “as a default rule ... [stemming from] the
original shareholder contract,”220 while allowing managers to “contract away
their duty of loyalty ...in piecemeal fashion.”221 This is certainly the more
middle ground approach. Contract neither justifies the non-recognition of
creditor interests 222 nor overrides the otherwise nonwaivable duties of
directors to the corporation.223 Instead, appraisal of the contractual matrix
surrounding the firm informs the business judgment of the directors as to

216. The “directors of an insolvent firm may consider the interests of creditors when assessing
their fiduciary duty to the corporation, which in some cases might justify taking a ‘less risky’ course
of action such as an efficient liquidation. But, if the directors, in their business judgment, decide to
take ‘extreme risk,’ that too will be protected by the business judgment rule.” Ellias & Stark, supra
note 62, at 760–61.
217. “[T]he relationship between a corporation and the holders of its debt securities, even
convertible debt securities, is contractual in nature” Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879
(Del. Ch. 1986).
218. Charles K. Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (Hill & McDonnell ed. 2013); see also Frederick Tung, Leverage
in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 115 (2009).
219. “It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize long-run interests of
corporation’s stockholders [and doing so] ‘at the expense’ of others does not . . . constitute a breach
of duty.” Katz, 508 A.2d at 879.
220. Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract: Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for
Creditors, 57 EMORY L. J. 809, 855 (2008).
221. Id.
222. Were this the case then shareholder value maximization may incentivize the efficient breach
of contracts, which is unlikely to the policy desired by courts and regulators. This may also give
rise to increased undercutting by creditors in relation to their own position in insolvency, relative to
the rest of the creditor class. For an exploration of such creditor undercutting, most significantly in
the realm of contractually defined thresholds of priority and charge crystallization. See Mokal, supra
note 177, at 616–20; see also Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priority among
Creditors, 88 YALE L. J. 1143 (1989); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80
VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994); Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 81, at 857.
223. See Tung, supra note 220; see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1481 (1989).
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which strategy is appropriate.224 This contractual matrix, at least insofar as it
is comprised of debt contracts, will be particularly sensitive to the financial
condition of the corporation. Contracts obviate much uncertainty by
allocating protection “according to each stakeholder’s respective
contribution,” 225 thereby guiding directorial judgment without requiring
“contract primacy,”226 nor enabling “overly risk adverse directors…to ignore
shareholder needs under the guise of fulfilling creditor duty.”227
8. Identifying a Reconciled Aggregate Class of Constituents
Granting credence to the widened residual class of interests would not
present an insurmountable task since it all occurs as a matter of business
judgment. As a matter of efficiency during solvency, directorial interest
should primarily align to the shareholders due to their residual status:
In order to maximize the firm’s value when the company is solvent,
directors’ duties in that period need to be aligned with the shareholders
rather than creditors. Since the losses are borne by the shareholders first,
when assessing strategic decisions directors should give paramount
consideration to the risk profile of that group.228

Furthermore, by their nature, “residual claimants to the firm’s assets...
have appropriate incentives to take economically rational decisions,” 229
thereby retaining a greater incentive to monitor agents and ensure corporate
success.230 However, similar to the task now faced by directors serving in an
artificially created unified class of shareholder interests, once their directorial
obligations span multiple constituencies directors must then identify the
aggregate class of corporate interests—especially where the residual benefit
begins to shift away from shareholders towards creditors. 231 Therefore, a
224. A central aspect for the application of the business judgment rule is that directors are
required to have considered all information reasonably available to them. This would
understandably include the pre-existing contractual obligations facing the company. The directors
will however be given deference by the courts when deciding what level of information the board
should reasonably consider. See In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., 1989 WL 7036, at *13
n.13 (Del. Ch. 1989).
225. Min Tan, Why Not Stakeholder Theory, 34(5) COMPANY LAW. 148, 155 (2013).
226. A “contract primacy regime [is] one in which ‘[s]hareholder primacy . . . remains[s] the
default rule but where “creditors [can] . . . negotiate for control . . . ,displacing shareholder primacy,’
per Ruben, supra note 179, at 352 (citing Tung, supra note 220, at 809-810) (alteration and ellipsis
in original).
227. Ruben, supra note 179, at 354 (emphasis added); Hu & Westbrook, supra note 54, at 1321.
228. GULLIFER & PAYNE, supra note 169, at 3.1.
229. Eidenmüller, supra note 174, at 15.
230. “As the residual claimants, shareholders have the appropriate incentives..., to make
discretionary decisions. The firm should invest in new products, plants and so forth, until the gains
and costs are identical at the margin.” EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 173.
231. “When a firm has become insolvent, ‘it is settled that under Delaware law’ the directors owe
fiduciary duties to the creditors because the “residual claimants” of corporate assets are the
constituency to which directors owe their allegiance. Before insolvency, the residual claimants were
the shareholders; after insolvency, they were the creditors. The fiduciary duty was never owed to
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party with a nominal interest would either see their interests align with those
of the aggregate class or be characterized as a deviant interest overridden by
the class. This approach to directorial fiduciary duty allows suitable
compromise in directorial direction largely unfettered by minority activists
minorities. It also avoids overt reliance on a threshold wherein duties shift
under the trust fund theory232 or are expanded at a bright-line trigger within
a residual framework under Quadrant.233
CONCLUSION
The emphasis on bright-line insolvency in the discharge of fiduciary
duties presents significant challenges to directors. These challenges are
somewhat mitigated by the fact that courts do not expect an absolute shift
from shareholder value maximization to creditor protection and efficient
liquidation. Instead, courts conceive of an aggregate residual class of interests
comprising of shareholders and creditors alike. This prevents an extreme shift
from sole primacy of shareholders at solvency to sole primacy of creditors at
insolvency. While the extent of a director’s change in strategy may be less
extreme, the severity of overt reliance on a bright-line moment, at which
insolvency is reached, remains a significant thorn in the side of directors
seeking to grapple with a corporation’s financial distress. An emphasis on the
business judgment rule, with regards to both balancing constituency interests
and the ex-ante identification of insolvency, serves to best alleviate these
difficulties.
The potential for reduced accountability may be of some concern, but as
this Article demonstrates, accountability remains where the business
judgment rule is absent—namely, self-dealing and gross negligence.
Furthermore, Arrowian theory tells us that there comes a point where there is
a trade-off between accountability and facilitating the authority of directors
to exercise their business judgment for the aggregate interests of debt and
equity providers. The need for such authority may be all the more preferable
when the corporation is facing insolvency and decisive action by the board is
desired. To quote a rather seminal adage, the courts are “‘not final because
[they]are infallible, but [they] are infallible only because [they] are final.”234
Neither courts nor boards are infallible, but someone must be final.”235
Ultimately, it is not the judiciary who must attempt corporate rescue or
protect corporate investors ex-ante. Neither is it the judiciary who have
presumed business expertise, 236 nor do they enjoy an albeit capitalist
shareholders because of ownership, but rather because of their residual claimant status.” Hu &
Westbrook, supra note 54, at 1340.
232. Id. at 1359.
233. Quadrant Structured Prods. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 174 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2014).
234. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953).
235. Bainbridge, supra note 32, at 121.
236. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 508 (Mich. 1919).
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democratic legitimacy 237 in their representation of shareholders.
Accordingly, constraining the deference owed to directors attempting to
grapple with the uncertainties of insolvency may ultimately undermine
boards in their good faith endeavors to prevent or limit the fallout of
insolvency.

237. See Kraakman et al., supra note 157, at Ch 3.

